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A long debate over the Great Depression puts forth the 
matter concerning the significance of financial 
intermediaries in affecting aggregate economic ac t iv i t i es . 
Although there are a lot of empirical findings supporting 
the ”money view" of monetary policy, proponents of "credit 
view" believe that monetary policy also functions through 
i t s direct effect on bank lending. However, in the wake of 
financial innovations and deregulation, the "credit view" 
to monetary policy i s insignificant because bank credits 
are no longer "special" and the nonbank credits are now 
more accessible to individuals. Nevertheless, economists 
continue to study how the financial intermediation works in 
relation to economic act ivi ty. Undeniably, financial 
intermediaries exert their influence on resource allocation 
through two different channels - formal and informal. In 
the developing countries, such informal channel i s both 
extensive and diverse. The informal sector accounts for 
most of the financial services provided to the noncorporate 
sector, i . e . , the small and medium-scale industry which 
greatly depend on external finance. 
In comparison to the case of the U.S., Taiwan has two 
particular features that are specific to i t s environment. 
One i s i t s financial dualism, i . e . the co-existence of 
formal financial intermediaries and informal money market. 
The other i s the sluggishness in i t s financial development 
together with i t s conservative att i tudes in the formulation 
of economic policy. We study Taiwan because i t s informal 
ii 
lending channel covers 20% to 30% of the to ta l credi ts . 
This informal, lending channel helps small-scale producers 
and enterprises finance their businesses. Admittedly, in 
the developing countries, small-scale producers and 
enterprises have long been known to account for a large 
share of economic activi ty. I t i s different from the case 
in any developed countries, such as the U.S.. Besides, the 
rapidity of economic growth in Taiwan cannot be matched 
with i t s backward financial development. I t s dualist ic 
financial structure a t t rac ts our attention. 
For further investigation, Granger causality tes t s are 
applied to examine the money-output and the credit—output 
link in Taiwan. In the bivariate t e s t s , both money and 
credit are relevant to output changes. However, output 
cannot cause money supply while both output and credit 
cause each other. In the t r ivar ia te t e s t , in the presence 
of credit, money cannot strongly accommodate output. In 
addition, we take the informal money market into account 
and do Granger causality tes t s once again. With the 
inclusion of credit from the informal lending channel, the 
explanatory power of credit to output i s much more 
strengthened. In this vein, the informal money market 
plays an important role in Taiwan economic development. 
Following the liberalization of the banking system 
and the establishment of financial markets in Taiwan, such 
informal money market loses i t s significance from time to 
time. However, consistent with our findings, we believe 
iii 
that i f the government can incorporate th i s informal money 
channel into the formal financial system, i t will be much 
eff ic ient and effective to provide a fu l le r range of 
services to sat isfy the needs of Taiwanese from different 
spectrum of the society. 
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Traditionally, theories are developed in explaining 
the impacts of money on an economy. In conventional 
Keynesian, Monetarists, and Classical models, money i s 
regarded as one of the main financial aggregates that do 
have impact on economic act ivi t ies . The macroeconomics 
l i tera ture following Keynes' General Theory largely ignored 
potential links between output behaviour and the 
performance of credit markets. Keynes‘ disciples devoted 
their attention to Keynes' l iquidity preference theory 
which emphasized the importance of money, as opposed to 
credit . Modigliani and Miller(MM) (1958) derived the 
formal proposition that real economic decisions were 
independent of financial structure. The MM theorem 
provided researchers with a rigorous just i f icat ion for 
abstracting from the complications induced by financial 
considerations• 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in their empirical work 
provided further impetus for viewing the money supply as 
the key financial aggregate. They emphasized the central 
importance of money while de-emphasizing the significance 
of a l l other aspects of the financial system. In their 
famous study of the historical relationship between money 
and output, they found that the money/output correlation 
was particularly apparent in the Great Depression. The 
money supply declined sharply along with output. 
In a different direction of causation, King and 
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Plosser (1984) found that much of the covariation between 
money and output was due to the money supply adjusting 
endogenously to movements in money demand. The implication 
of th is possibili ty was that s t a t i s t i ca l success of money 
in vector auto-regressions may have resulted from i t s 
strong endogenous component. In any case, th is argument 
bear the same t r a i t that money is relevant to aggregate 
economic activity. 
Nevertheless, some economists are not sat isf ied with 
this "money view"• Controversies over the Great Depression 
triggered off the criticism over the relevance of money. 
The counter argument was pioneered by Irving Fisher (1933) • 
In his debt-deflations theory, he pointed out that the 
Great Depressioil in 1929 was basically not a monetary 
phenomenon. The severity of the economic downturn in th is 
period was due to the poor performance of financial 
markets. Since then, financial markets and inst i tut ions 
deserved serious attention since the proponents of money 
were attacked by other economists who believed that the 
financial structure /capacity might affect the economic 
activity. 
Beginning with Gurley and Shaw (1955), an attempt 
began to direct attention toward the overall interaction 
between financial structure and real activity. They put 
emphasis on financial intermediation, and particularly on 
the role of intermediaries in the credit supply process as 
opposed to 七he money supply process. Gurley and Shaw 
argued that with the evolution of the intermediary system 
3 
and lending insti tut ions with nonmonetary l i ab i l i t i e s , the 
exclusive focus on money becomes less jus t i f ied . In the 
rea l i t i es of modern financial markets, even if the central 
bank can control the narrowly defined money stock, the 
supply of close money substitutes may freely adjust to 
offset changes in money supply or demand. This movement 
mitigates the response of interest rates. 
Irvconsistence with Gurley and Shaw's interpretation, 
Friedman (1980, 1982) found that the existence of money 
substitutes could explain the ins tabi l i ty in monetary 
velocity and the importance of credit flows could underlie 
t h e stable relationship between debt and output. 
In an influential paper, Bernanke (1983) analyzed the 
relative importance of monetary versus financial factors in 
t h e Great Depression. His central conclusion was that the 
collapse of the financial system was an important 
determinant of the Depression's depth and persistence - and 
that monetary forces alone were "quantitatively 
insufficient" to explain these phenomena. He posed a high 
correlation between the financial c r i s i s and macroeconomic 
act ivi t ies during the Great Depression. 
In recent years, theories of capital structure and 
intermediation have been developed. A discussion of 
intermediation centres on attempts to explain 
intermediaries as an optimal inst i tut ional responses to 
financial market inefficiencies. At the same time, 
developments in the economics of information and incentives 
faci l i tated theoretical progress on the understanding of 
4 
the role of credit in the economy. 
A comprehensive l i terature review is given in chapter 
2 to sum up al l the above arguments. To begin with, a 
model set by Brunner and Meltzer (1988) elucidate the 
mechanism behind the interaction of money and credit i s 
introduced. Besides, other relevant theories describing 
the joint determination of money, bank credit - loans and 
investments of commercial banks - and some interest rates 
on the bank credit market are also i l lus t ra ted . 
Moreover, in chapter 2, we also examine the money-
output link and credit-output link. Admittedly, money and 
credit are collinear. However, in some empirical findings, 
the credit-output link seems more firmly established than 
the money-output link. Most of the economists concertedly 
arrived at the conclusion that credit which i s one of the 
instruments made by financial intermediaries contributes to 
the smoothness of economic act iv i t ies and to the settlement 
of transaction. Nevertheless, the controversies over the 
significance of the money-output link and the credit-output 
link remain open-ended. A lot of s t a t i s t i ca l techniques, 
such as the Granger Causality tes ts , were introduced to 
tes t their relationship. Before using these instruments, 
we try to clarify the "money view" and "credit view" in 
order to have a clear picture on their relationship and the 
mechanism through wh i ch money/credit can affect economic 
act ivi t ies . 
With respect to the "money view", i t tends to 
emphasize the special nature of the l i ab i l i ty side of bank 
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balance sheets. The change of money supply affects the 
real interest rate and thus influences investment and 
output. The "credit view” of monetary policy i s part of a 
much broader l i terature on the role of credit in the 
macroeconomy. I t is generally understood that the credit 
view i s the idea that monetary policy actions not only 
affect the economy through their effect on the l i ab i l i t y 
side of-banks' balance sheets, that i s , by affecting the 
quantity of money； but also through their direct effect on 
bank lending. Proponents of the credit view argue that 
even under extreme conditions where either interest rates 
do not respond to monetary policy actions or where spending 
is unresponsive to changes in interest rates, monetary 
policy actions affect the economy because of their direct 
effect on bank loans. 、 
After having a clear picture about the money view and 
c r e d i t view, we start to look into the financial structure 
of the developing countries. The l i terature about informal 
finance reflects the notion that the informal money markets 
do greatly foster the economic development in the 
developing countries." By analogy, th is informal lending 
channel more or less strengthens the credit-output link. 
We may return to this argument later on. 
In fact, the study of the money-output link and the 
credit-output ; l ink are no longer new issues.
1
 Some 
economists used the U.S. as a case study. Nonetheless, 
i S e e Sims(1972), King and Plosser(1984), Bernanke(1986), 
Bernanke and Kinded^SS) , L O w n ( 1 9 8 8) , Lown and Hayes(1990). 
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they have not yet reached a consensus on whether money or 
credit has a stronger predictive power on economic 
activity. In the U.S., people borrow money from the formal 
financial intermediaries which are well established and 
organized. Therefore, to choose a developed country to 
study is nothing more than a duplicated job. 
Among al l possible choices, we choose Taiwan mainly 
because i t s economic development i s admiringly excellent 
and successful. Apart from this , i t has a large informal 
money market which covers 20% to 30% of the sources of 
credit funds to business enterprises. The stringent credit 
control by the government also forces investors to seek 
financial support from this informal lending channel. Such 
dualistic feature of financial system make our findings 
more interesting. 
To begin with, we outline Taiwan's financial 
development in chapter 3. I t s current economic profile as 
well as i t s financial development in the past four decades 
are conclusively given in chapter 3. Starting from 1949, 
a series of campaigns had been launched, such as the 
issuance of new currency, preferential interest rate 
deposits, import restr ict ions and the like. Apart from 
these, Taiwanese thr i f t iness was one of the reasons 
accounting for i t s economic achievement. However, the 
government always maintained a conservative outlook in 
enacting i t s policies toward financial intermediation. As 
a result , the banking system was inward-looking and rather 
7 
rigid for a period from the 1950s to the 1970s. The 
domestic banks were s t r i c t l y controlled by the government. 
The manipulation of loans among the banking sector was 
s t r i c t ly restricted and rationed by the government. 
Households and small enterprises could not get access to 
banks for credit because they could not come up with 
collateral . Thus, an unorganized money market co-existed 
with the formal financial ins t i tu t ions . I t s emergence 
denotes the unsatisfied demand for funds and the under-
development of the banking and financial system. 
After the introduction of Taiwan economic development, 
we apply Granger Causality t e s t s in chapter 4 to tes t the 
money-output link and the credit-output link in Taiwan. 
The testing procedure s ta r t s with bivariate tes t s in which 
we set up three propositions: f i r s t , we tes t the hypothesis 
that money causes output； second, we tes t the hypothesis 
that credit causes output； third, we tes t the hypothesis 
that money causes credit . After that , t r ivar ia te tes ts are 
undertaken to find the causality of money and output in the 
presence of credit. However, regardless of what results 
that we get in chapter 4, they cannot give a fu l l picture 
of the financial phenomena in Taiwan. Loan restr ict ions by 
domestic banks more or less suppressed the investment of 
Taiwanese, especially for those poor households and small 
enterprises. An informal lending channel ( i .e . the 
unorganized money market) acts as their last resort to 
finance their economic ac t iv i t ies . The loans supplied by 
this informal money market covers 20% to 30% of the to ta l 
8 
loan supply. In this vein, bank loans are no longer the 
only source of credit . There are outlets from which people 
can borrow money although at a higher in teres t ra te . For 
th is sake, we s tar t to cast weight on the impact of 
informal finance in the case of Taiwan. 
In chapter 5, we t ry to include the loans from th i s 
unorganized money market to run the causality t e s t s . The 
loans supplied by the informal money market contributed a 
significant part in affecting Taiwan economic ac t iv i t i es . 
After the causality t es t s , we also describe the functions 
of the informal money market in Taiwan. I t i s interest ing 
to find that such informal money markets, though they are 
now shrinking continuously, had played a c r i t i ca l role in 
fac i l i t a t ing economic development in Taiwan. I t s existence 
also increases the predictive accuracy between credit and 
output. 
A conclusion i s given in chapter 6 to summarise a l l 
the resul ts aforesaid. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON MONEY, CREDIT AND INFORMAL FINANCE 
2•1 The Great Depression 
Economists have attempted to examine the causes of the 
Great Depression in 1929. Literature and evidence
2
 support 
the relevance of role of monetary policies in the early-
stages of the Great Depression. In th is respect, th i s 
worldwide recession might be part ial ly, if not completely, 
attributable to a contractionary monetary phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, Irving Fisher (1933), as one of the 
Depression-era economists, started to c r i t i c i se the 
relevance of money in the Great Depression. He believed 
that during the Great Depression, the prevalence of 
over-indebtedness accompanied with deflation gave r ise to 
the persistent contraction of deposit currency, and a 
greater reduction in the net worth of business. As a 
result , the ensuing business downturn precipitated a wave 
of bankruptcies, thus enhancing the downturn. 
Consequently, the continuous fa l l in the level of prices 
and the loss of confidence in investment further slowed 
down the output level.
3、 
In Mishkin's paper (1978), he analyzed data from the 
Great Depression to determine whether financial factors 
affected consumer spending. He found that the behaviour of 
household's net financial position in fact had a 
2
See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) of the historical 
relationship between money and output. 
3
For detai ls , see Irving Fisher's debt-deflation theory (1933 
p.341) 
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significant influence on consumer demand which in return 
affected the aggregate economic act ivi ty . Later, in an 
influential paper, Bernanke (1983) believed the major 
components of the financial collapse were due to the loss 
of confidence in financial ins t i tu t ions , primarily 
commercial banks and the widespread insolvency of debtors. 
Bernanke then posed a highly correlation of the financial 
c r i s i s with macroeconomic ac t iv i t ies during the Great 
Depression.
4
 In addition, Gertler (1988) in his 
comprehensive study of financial structure and aggregate 
economic activi ty, concluded that economic act ivi ty was 
fac i l i ta ted by the volume of credits through the financial 
intermediaries. 
Nevertheless, with reference to Gurley and Shaw 
(1955), they thought that in the early stage of financial 
development, commercial banking was the only major form of 
intermediation which provided both transactions and lending 
services. In th is view, the money stock might be a useful 
proxy for financial activity since the supply of inside 
money 一 a major component of commercial bank l i a b i l i t i e s -
was closely related to the overall level of financial 
intermediation. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) pointed out 
that banking failures were important because of their 
effects on liquidity and the money supply, or instead 
because they undermined the abi l i ty of the financial sector 
々Consistent with Bernanke,s, Hamilton (1987) in his study of 
the monetary factors in the Great Depression concluded that 
the impact of monetary policy on real act ivi ty was operated 
"through the disruption of the real services of intermediation 
on the financial sec tor . . . " (p.145) 
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as a whole to perform the real service of evaluating and 
providing loans for the worthwhile investment project. One 
important outcome of Friedman and Schwartz's work was an 
alternative explanation for the role of financial markets 
in the Great Depression; the story emphasized the central 
importance of money while de-emphasizing the significance 
of a l l other aspects of the financial system. 
All ,the above arguments more or less have suspected, 
if not denied, the role of monetary policy as a dominant 
and credible explanation for the persistence of the Great 
Depression during the late twenties and early t h i r t i e s . 
Hence, economists have looked into the new issue of the 
"credit view" to see whether i t has any connection with 
economic ac t iv i t ies . 
2.2 Monev-Credit Relationship 
Money acts as a medium of exchange, through which 
transactions and business are smoothly fac i l i ta ted . In 
the macroeconomic analysis, in the IS-LM framework, the 
equilibrium output level and interest rate are determined 
through the interaction of goods market and money market. 
Besides, the impact of exogenous shocks may be analyzed 
under the IS-LM model. Money, in that sense, i s a target 
variable in the pursuit of an effective economic policy.
5 
In the simple Keynesian and Monetarist models, 
presumably, money can have important real effects not only 
5
For simplicity, we do not consider any extreme cases, such as 
the liquidity trap. 
12 
because prices are sticky, but importantly also because the 
nominal money stock i s exogenous and therefore cannot 
adjust endogenously to changes in money demand. In 
accordance with Keynesian l iquidi ty preference, money does 
exert i t s importance to affect the transactional demand and 
the velocity of circulation. 
Shortly a f te r Gurley and Shaw (1955) emphasized the 
importanqe of the financial system, Modigliani and 
Miller(MM) (1958) derived the formal proposition that real 
economic decisions were independent of financial 
s t ructure .
6
 In the 1970s, the success of money in 
reduced-form output equations helped rejuvenate the case 
for money as the central financial aggregate. Different 
s t a t i s t i c a l methods under different propositions have 
brought out the evidence to jus t i fy the significance of the 
money一output relat ionship. 7 On the whole, the issue over 
the role of money remain open-ended. 
In the following, we s t a r t to elucidate the 
relationship between money and credit by using the model 
set by Brunner and Meltzer (1988).
8
 For simplicity, they 
assumed that credits were composed of loans and investments 
which were in the assets side of the banks' balance sheet. 
At the outset, they devised a set of constraints to 
6
This implies that financial variables s t a r t disappearing from 
empirical investment equations under the set t ing of perfect 
markets. 
7
See Sims(1972) for further deta i ls . 
8
In thei r a r t i c l e , they stated that the analysis of 
transmission was incomplete without taking both the money and 
credit markets and their interaction into account. 
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r e s t r i c t the abi l i ty of the banks to supply bank credi t . 
The res t r ic t ions are: 
(1) An adjusted monetary base, B
a
 ,which includes to ta l 
unborrowed reserves(Ru), and currency held by the 




 = Ru + Cp (2.2.1) 
(2) The behaviour of commercial banks i s affected by the 
reserve rat io , r , which i s measured by the ra t io of 
to ta l reserves to the banking system's to ta l deposits 
and varied with changes in the average requirement 
ra t ios against demand (r
d
) and time deposits(r
1
), 
average yield on government securi t ies( iG) , an index 
of loan rates(iL) and the discount rate(p). Besides, 
r i s also influenced by other variables which are 




 , iG fp , iL ； ^ ) (2.2.2) 
The derivatives of r with respect to r
d
 and p are 
positive whereas with respect to the two market rates of 
in teres t , the derivatives are negative. In addition, the 
borrowing rat io of commercial banks, b, which expresses the 
banks' par t i t ion of to ta l reserves between borrowed and 
unborrowed reserves, also affects the commercial banks' 
behaviour. The borrowing ratio responds positively to the 
market rates of interest , iG and iL, but negatively to the 
discount rate. The omitted factors that have played a 
1 4 
sizeable role to the change of borrowing rat io are 
represented by II2. 
b = b(iG , iL ;II2) (2.2.3) 
If we ignore the effects of interest rates and the public 's 
behaviour on the credit market, a relat ively simple 
solution for the stock of bank credit can be obtained. The 
banks‘ balance sheet together with the definit ion of the 
reserve and borrowing rat io implies the relation between 
the banks' desired stock of earning assets Eb and the 








 Ru (2.2.4) 
(r - b) 
The above equation associates "bank credit" with the volume 
of unborrowed reserves by means of the reserve and 
borrowing rat ios, two parameters characterizing bank 
behaviour. 
In account of the behaviour of the public, the rat io 
of time to demand deposits, t , which i s dependent on the 
current monetary process, seems significant in affecting 
the stock of bank credit . The time deposit ra t io appears 
to be highly sensitive to the rate paid on time deposits 
( i t ) , to the yields on government securi t ies and loans. In 
addition, the ratio responds positively to the public 's 
real wealth, w. Equation (2.2.5) states the relation. 
t = t ( i t ,iG , iL ,w) (2.2.5) 
The derivatives with respect to i t and w are positive; the 
others are negative. The larger the t ra t io , the larger 
the response of bank credit relative to the response of 
1 5 
demand deposits. Increase in the ceil ing interest rate on 
time deposits or reductions in the reserve requirement 
rat ios both have the same effect to raise the time deposit 
ra t io , t , resulting in a greater expansion of bank credi t . 
Brunner and Meltzer (1988) have successfully 
constructed a theory of the money supply to incorporate an 
analysis of bank earning assets. The extended theory 
describes the joint determination of money, bank credit -
loans and investments of commercial banks - and some 
interest rates on the bank credit market. The solutions 
combine the behaviour of the banks and the public with the 
constraints imposed by the monetary policy. The main theme 
we should grasp in the above discussion i s just to render 
ourselves with a more thorough recognition about the 
relationship between money and credit . 
2.3 Models
9
 in Credit-Output Analysis 
Since the money/output link i s weakened by the ongoing 
financial innovations and deregulation, credit s t a r t s to 
establish i t s strength to account for the non-financial 
ac t iv i t ies . Since money and credit move together, the 
credit-output link shows up as a correlation between money 
and output. However, some finding shows that the link of 
credit/output i s stronger than the link between demand 
deposits and output.
10
 Some economists begin to analyse the 
9
For detai ls , see Friedman(1983) p.180-186. Patinkin's Model 
were modified by Bernanke and Blinder(1988). 
10
See Cara S.Lown (1988) p,1-9. 
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role of credit on aggregate demand. Undeniably, no matter 
whether the role of credit i s significant or not, i t 
contributes to the smoothness of economic ac t iv i t ies and to 
the settlement of transaction. 
With reference to Patinkin's "commodities and credit" 
curve, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) developed several models 
of aggregate demand which allows roles for both money and 
"credit" ..(bank loans) . In their model, there are three 
assets : money, bonds, and loans. I t i s assumed that both 
borrowers and lenders choose between bonds and loans 
according to the interest rates on the two credit 
instruments. If T i s the interest rate on loans and i i s 
the interest rates on bonds, the loan demand i s : 
L
d
 = L(T,i,y) (2.3.1) 
- + + 
The dependence on GNP(y) captures the transactions demand 
for credit , which might arise, for example, from working 
capital or liquidity considerations. Consider banks as the 
sole suppliers of loan, the amount of loan i s related to 
the desired portfolio proportions dependent on rates of 
return on the available assets. If a bank has to keep r 
(in %) of total deposit(D) as required reserve and i t s 
assets consist of reserves(R), bonds(B
b
) , and loans(L
s
), 
thus the condition for clearing the loan market i s 
L(T,i,y) 二 ； L ( T , i ) D ( l - r ) (2.3.2) 
The money market i s described by a conventional LM curve. 
Suppose banks hold excess reserves equal to e(i)D(l-r) . 
Then the supply of deposits (we ignore cash) i s equal to 
bank reserves, R, times the money multiplier, 
1 7 
D(i,y) = m(i)R (2.3.3) 
The remaining market i s the goods market, which we 
summarize in a conventional IS curve, written generically 
as 
y = Y(i,T) (2.3.4) 
If we use (2.3.3) to substitute D(l-r) on the right-hand 
side of (2.3.2) by L(r,i ,y)= (l-r)m(i)R , then (2.3.2) 
can be solved for T in the function of i , y, and R: 
T = (2.3.5) 
+ + -
Finally, substitute (2.3.5) into (2.3.4) to get 
y = Y(i, 0(i,y,R〉) (2.3.6) 
The CC curve i s derived from equation (2.3.6), which i s 
negatively sloped like an IS curve. However, i t i s shifted 
by monetary policy(R) and by credit-market shocks that 
affect either the L(.) or ；l(.) functions, while the IS 
curve i s no七. By analogy, even with a l iquidity trap, 
monetary policy s t i l l matters because i t influences the CC 
curve. 
Most conventional shocks work in th i s model just as 
they do in IS/LM. The only pronounced difference i s 
that a r ise in bank reserves (irrespective of i t s causes), 
may lead to the r ise of the interest rate in the credit 
model. Ambiguity arises because an increase in R sh i f t s 
both the CC and LM curves outward. By analogy, the credit 
channel makes monetary policy more expansionary than in 
IS/LM and therefore raises the transactions demand for 
money by more than in the conventional model. 
...'
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In short, the role of money and credit with regard to 
their impact on economic ac t iv i t i es are worth studying. 
The credit view holders believe that the effect of monetary 
policies depends both on the amount of money banks create 
and on how much lending they do in the process. With the 
consideration of the role of credit , i t may further 
strengthen the explanatory power of the model and make i t 
more assertive and credible. 
2.4 "Money view" versus "Credit view" to monetary 
transmission mechanism 
The distinction between the "credit" and "money" views 
on policy transmission can provide a clear causal 
relationship in the study of economic ac t iv i t i e s . First of 
a l l , le t us s ta r t from a pure money version of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
Assume there are effectively two asset - money and 
bond. What the banking sector can do i s to deal with the 
l i ab i l i t y side of i t s balance sheet. In other words, i t 
can create money by issuing demand deposits. On the asset 
side of their balance sheets, banks do nothing unique 一 
like household sector, they too just invest in bond. 
In this two asset-world, monetary non-neutrality 
arises if movements in reserves affect real interest rates. 
The transmission works as follow: a decrease in reserves 
reduces the banking sector 's abi l i ty to issue demand 
deposits. • This implies that the banking sector must also 
hold (on net) fewer bonds. Thus the household sector must 
hold less money, and more bonds. If prices do not adjust 
1 9 
ful ly and instantaneously, households will have less money 
in real terms, and equilibrium will require an increase in 
real interest rates. This in turn can have real effects on 
investment, and ultimately, on aggregate economic act ivi ty . 
The "money" view can be effected through the change in real 
interest rate.
1 1 
In contrast, in the "credit" view, there are three 
assets 一 money, publicly issued bonds, and intermediated 
"loans". The banking sector now can make loans in addition 
to money creation. In th is three-asset world, monetary 
policy can work not only through i t s impact on the bond-
market rate of interest , but also through i t s independent 
impact on the supply of intermediated loans. 
To think about the distinction between the "money" and 
"credit" channels, take an extreme examples where 
households view the two assets - money and bonds 一 as very-
close substitute. In th is case, a decrease in reserve that 
leads to a decline in the money supply will have a minimal 
impact on the interest rate on publicly-held bonds. Thus 
the money channel i s very weak. However, the decrease in 
reserves can s t i l l have important real consequences, i f i t 
leads banks to cut back on loan supply. Thus, the cost of 
loans relative to bond will r ise , and those firms that rely 
11
In Brunner's paper (1989), three major conclusions concerning 
the role of money and monetary policy have merged. Firs t , 
monetary impulses are a major factor accounting for variations 
in output, employment and prices. Second, movements in the 
money stock are the most reliable measure of the thrust of 
monetary impulses. Third, the behaviour of the monetary 
authorities dominates movements in the money stock over 
business cycles. 
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on bank lending (say because they do not have access to 
public bond markets) will be led to cut back on investment. 
In th i s respect, monetary policy can have significant real 
effect that are not summarised by i t s consequence for open-
market in teres t ra tes . 
Precisely, the uniqueness of "credit" view can be 
defined as follows: 
1. The lending view centers on the premise that bank 
loans and publicly issued bonds are not perfect 
subst i tutes . I t does not hinge c r i t i ca l ly on whether 
or not there i s quantity rationing in the loan market. 
2. Similar to the pure money view, the essence of the 
lending view can probably be captured in a wide range 
of models. Indeed, the only recent modelling attempts 
that we know of are essentially extensions of the IS-
LM framework, most notably Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988). 
Why i s i t necessary to distinguish the "money view" 
from the "credit view"? We can l i s t five reasons to 
account for i t . Firs t ly , i f the lending view i s correct, 
monetary policy can have important effects on investment 
and aggregate act ivi ty without moving open-market interest 
rates by much. Secondly, standard investment and inventory 
models, which typically uses open-market rates as a measure 
of the cost of financing, may give a misleading picture of 
the extent to which different sectors are directly affected 
by monetary policy. Thirdly, the quantitative importance 
2 1 
of the lending channel i s likely to be sensitive to a 
number of inst i tut ional characteristics of the financial 
markets (e.g. the rise of "non-bank banks", the development 
of the public
 11
 junk bond" market, etc) . Thus understanding 
the lending channel i s a prerequisite to understanding how 
innovation in financial inst i tut ion might influence the 
potency of monetary policy. Fourthly, since the aggregate 
impact of the lending channel may depend on the financial 
condition of the banking sector, when bank capital i s 
depleted (and particularly when bank loan-making i s tied to 
risk-based capital requirements) the lending channel i s 
likely to be weaker. This has obvious implications for the 
abil i ty of monetary policy to offer particular sorts of 
adverse shocks. Lastly, the lending view implies that 
monetary policy can have distributional consequences that 
would not arise were policy transmitted solely through a 
money channel, For example, the lending view suggests that 
the costs of tight policy might fa l l disproportionately on 
smaller firm who are unable to gain access to pubic capital 
markets. Such distributional considerations may be 
important to bear in mind when formulating policy. 
However, evidence shows that the loan adjustment to 
monetary policy is quite slow and thus i t may undercut the 
plausibil i ty of important effects coming through shif ts in 
loan supply on economic activity. For example, King (1986〉 
in his studies found that monetary aggregates did perform 
2 2 
a better job of predicting act iv i t ies .
1 2
 In other words, 
money tends to lead output while loans tend to move roughly 
contemporaneously with output. Romer and Romer (1990) find 
similar results, and interpret them as cutting against the 
lending view.
13 
According to Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , the 
contractual nature of loan agreements limits the speed with 
which loan volume can shrink. Recent work by Morgan (1992) 
confirms that much of the sluggishness in loan volume i s 
indeed due to loan commitment. He finds that loans that 
are made to customers that do not have commitments begin to 
fa l l relatively quickly, responding about as fast as 
sharply as monetary aggregates. Thus, the response of loan 
supply to movements in monetary policy does seem quite 
plausible. 
Apart from this , the supply of credit may be regulated 
by the government within the banking sector. With 
stringent credit control by the government/ i t may directly 
affect the flow of funds to the borrowers. However the 
credit control on enterprises may not be successful if the 
la t ter can raise fund from the open market. Therefore, the 
tight monetary policy operates through standard interest 
channels may not successfully depress economic act iv i t ies 
12
For many borrowers, bank loans have no close substitutes. 
Consequently, variation in the quantity of bank loans caused 
by reserve changes might explain the real impacts of monetary 
policy. 
"Evidence i s consistent with a conventional textbook account 
in which the Federal Reserve's influence over the economy 
stems from the impact of monetary policy on the stock of 
transaction balances. 
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and reduce the demand for credit . In th is scenario, 
financial intermediaries do play an important role in 
manipulating the uses and the direction of the fund flow. 
2.5 informal Finance in the Developing Countries 
Our understanding of financial development would 
remain incomplete unless we can learn more about the 
informal、 financial sector which can account for a 
significant part of economic progress in the developing 
countries. The growing but scattered l i tera ture pertaining 
to informal finance has denoted the importance of i t in the 
developing countries. Informal finance encompasses the 
mobilization of savings as well as the extension of credit . 
Informal lenders provide financial services as well as 
credit, including the transfer of funds within countries, 
remittances between countries, guarantees, safe-keeping, 
etc. 
Informality is characterized by highly personalized 
loan transactions entailing face-to-face dealings with 
borrowers and f lexibi l i ty in respect of loan purchase, 
interest rates, collateral requirements, maturity periods 
and debt rescheduling. The scale of operations of 
individual informal lenders i s relatively small, primarily 
because informal lending is usually based on personal 
knowledge of the borrower. Since individual lenders are 
operating in a circumscribed area or in a special niche of 
the market, costs are saved in obtaining the information 
about the creditworthiness of the borrowers. More 
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important, informal lenders do riot suffer from the in t ra -
agency problems of formal hierarchical financial 
inst i tut ions. They functions outside the purview of 
regulations imposed on the formal financial sector in 
respect of capital, reserve and liquidity requirements, 
ceilings on lending and deposit rates, mandatory credit 
targets, audit and reporting requirement and so on. As a 
result , as compared with the formal financial sector, the 
informal sec七or has greater f lexib i l i ty that enables i t to 
reach borrowers who are rationed out by the formal sector, 
and to reduce transaction costs. The lower transaction 
costs of informal finance are the outcome not only of the 
relative absence of regulation i t enjoys, but also of i t s 
scale of operations, specialization and freedom from agency 
problems. All these factors contribute to i t s importance 
in the developing countries. 
The backwardness of financial development in the 
developing countries i s always regarded as an impediment to 
economic growth. The growth of financial sector cannot 
keep pace with the growth in real sector. Nevertheless, 
the informal financial intermediaries in the developing 
countries do play a vi ta l role in financing productive 
act ivi t ies , especially for those small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
As a matter of fact, small-scale producers and 
enterprises have long been known to account for a large 
share of economic activity in developing countries. Most 
of these enterprises are noncorporate: small farmers, 
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producers, tradespeople, and independent traders. 
Noncorporate businesses d i f fer greatly in thei r demand for 
financial services. Since noncorporate borrowers rarely 
have collateral acceptable to banks. Their 
creditworthiness i s d i f f i cu l t for formal intermediaries to 
gauge. I t seems that formal financial arrangements are 
often not well suited to the needs of the noncorporate 
sector. As a resul t , they seek help from the informal 
money market. 
In the developing countries, the informal finance i s 
both extensive and diverse. The informal sector accounts 
for most of the financial services provided to the 
n o n c o r p o r a t e sector. In addition to family and friends, 
who provide a large percentage of loans, informal finance 
consists of professional moneylenders, pawnbrokers, 
tradespeople, and associations of acquaintances. 
Loans from moneylenders are typically short-term. They 
are rarely tied to col la teral . Most moneylenders use their 
own funds for lending. Interest rates are high. Besides, 
borrowers who own marketable assets may turn to pawnbrokers 
for short-term credit." Pawnbrokers take possession of 
assets for a fixed term and lend against them at an agreed 
rate of interest . During the term of the loan the borrower 
is free to repay and thereby to redeem his asset. 
Pawnbroking is an example of how collateral i s used in some 
informal arrangements to reduce risk and to f i l l the gaps 
in information that characterizes the noncorporate sector. 
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In addition, an important form of group finance i s 
that represented by rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAS). Indeed ROSCAS are t radi t ional 
inst i tut ions found in a variety of forms in rural and urban 
areas. Their common feature i s a periodic pooling of 
contributions to a common ki t ty which goes by turn to every 
member of the association. The sequence of the rotation i s 
being determined by consensus, lot tery, or a system of 
bidding in each round. ROSCAS possess the advantages of 
accessibil i ty, f lex ib i l i ty and adaptability, ranging from 
small neighbourhood or workplace-based ins t i tu t ions whose 
primarily attraction i s that they are a vehicle for 
savings, to larger, more impersonal organizations, which 
offer a quick means of raising funds urgently for 
production and consumption. Intermediation costs are 
reduced to minimum, and generally consist only of what 
amounts in effect to an interes t - f ree loan to the organizer 
who takes the entire ki t ty in the f i r s t round. 
Informal credit i s said to f rus t ra te selective credit 
controls because i t responds to demand conditions rather 
than to the credit pr ior i t ies governments seek to enforce 
through the formal financial sector. Informal finance 
improves productivity and allocative efficiency. Interest 
rates set in the informal sector may truly ref lect the 
market condition and credits are diverted to their most 
productive uses accordingly. 
Evidence was found in the l i te ra ture which ref lec ts 
the complementary role of informal finance that does 
........... ：^lf> •.^  ‘•；' ,':...’. : / . . . . . . . • ： . • : . ； ‘ 
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contribute significantly in the developing countries. An 
important issue in estimating the size of informal 
financial markets i s the actual measurement of credit or 
deposits. According to the Social Weather Stations (SWS) 
survey, informal urban borrowing in the Philippines 
accounted for 45 per cent of tota l urban household 
borrowing in 1987. Based on the findings of the case 
studies of urban informal manufacturing enterprises carried 
out under the Bangladesh study, relating to the share of 
informal credit in financing in i t i a l , expansion and working 
capital, about a third of total urban credit i s informal 
share. Another Asian countries, such as Thailand, India, 
Malaysia, and Korea, they fa l l within the same range as the 
estimates for the above 七wo countries.14 Clearly, the size 
of the informal financial sector i s rather large in the 
developing countries-
Following the financial l iberalisat ion and 
deregulation of banking system, the informal sector has 
shrunk gradually. However, i t s significance cannot be 
total ly neglected. Indeed, formal and informal finance 
each has i t s areas of comparative advantage. Formal 
finance is more readily able to accommodate large and long-
term loans because of i t s greater reliance on the pooling 
of deposits and maturity transformation. I t thus enjoys 
greater economies of scale and scope. Formal finance i s 
better suited to the needs of large enterprises. But i t i s 
less successful in serving the needs of the small and 
14
See Prabhu Ghate(19 92) P.58-67. 
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medium-sized enterprises. In contrast, since the 
advantages of informal finance stem from i t s lower 
transaction costs, the comparative advantage of informal 
finance l ies in making loans which are particularly 
transaction-cost-intensive A including small and short 
duration loans. Besides, i t s f lex ib i l i ty regarding 
collateral enables i t to finance a large number of service 
ac t iv i t ies where fixed assets are not created as a security 
f or the loan. Interlinkage of credit with marketing 
transactions gives informal lenders a comparative advantage 
in supplying working capital in both agriculture and small 
industry, where the lender i s often also a supplier of raw 
materials or a buyer of final products• In short, both 
the formal and informal financial sectors are 
complementary. Policy should proceed on a recognition of 
this complementarity and fac i l i ta te information finance in 
i t s own areas of comparative advantage.
15
 This will 
increase the flow and reduce the cost of credit to 
borrowers neglected by the formal sector. 
？.6 Summary 
Controversies over the issues of money-output link and 
credit-output link is s t i l l prevalent. Different 
s ta t i s t i ca l instruments, such as auto-vector regression, 
Granger causality tes t , were devised to tes t the validity 
of these monetary aggregates and credit aggregates in 
relation to the economic activity. Controversies over the 
15
See Prabhu Ghate(l992) P.161-202. 
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correlations between money, income and price remain 
unsolved. Lown and Hayes (1990), in the i r study of the 
U.S., found that credit movements did not contain more 
information about nominal output movements during the 1960s 
and 1970s than during the 1980s. Rather, credit has a 
predictive relationship with real output over both time 
periods. In other words, the credit-output link may be 
regarded as the remedial measure to the explanation of 
economic changes.
16 
As a conclusion, Friedman(1988) said, "credit i s a 
measure of act ivi ty on the l i ab i l i t y side of the public 's 
balance sheet, while the monetary aggregates are various 
measures of non-bank public 's assets ." I t may be f ru i t fu l 
i f we can encompass both money and credit as information 
variables to the study of monetary policy. On the other 
hand, even though the "credit view" to monetary 
transmission mechanism i s no longer held due to financial 
l iberalization and deregulation, however, a lot of research 
have been done regarding the relevance of financial 
intermediation on economic act ivi ty . In fact , the "credit 
view" owes i t s origin from the issues over the financial 
intermediation. To study the credit-output link in the 
developing countries, the importance of informal financial 
sector should be taken into consideration. 
16
Their studies showed that Ml have a stronger predictive 
relationship with nominal output during the 1960s and 1970s 
than credit did. This conclusion i s consistent with the 
conclusions reported by King(198 6). 
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CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN 
3.1 CURRENT ECONOMIC PROFILE 
In the study of economic development, the success of 
newly industrialized countries have received the most 
attention. Taiwan i s deservedly regarded as one of these 
prominent examples. In accounting for i t s economic 
achievements, we must look into several perspectives, 
such as i t s government's contributions, the financial 
development as well as the trend of global economy in 
affecting Taiwan's economy. The following paragraph i s 
largely written for the discussion of i t s financial 
development and the change of i t s economic structure. 
Most economists believe that Taiwanese t h r i f t i s one 
of the reasons contributing to i t s economic development. 
Undeniably, the saving rate in Taiwan i s steadily 
increasing. And i t may be noteworthy that most of the 
saving i s used to finance public enterprises in i t s 
ear l ies t development af ter 1949. Other factors 
accounting for i t s economic progress are the effective 
measures adopted by the government to s tabi l ize the price 
level and subsidize the exported industries. Besides, 
the international demand for primary products, e.g. 
foodstuff, raw materials, especially sugar cane in 
Taiwan, led to a continuous favourable balance of trade, 
resulting in a high accumulation of foreign reserves. 
With the aids of U.S. in i t s early phase of development 
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and the Land Reform launched by the government, the real 
GNP growth rate was around 11%—13% per annum. 
Despite these changes in i t s economy, the banking 
development was also of significance to be taken into 
account. Following th is line of thought a step further, 
we can also look into i t s financial development, such as 
the establishment of money market, capital market, 
overseas Banking centres and the l ike. To analyze i t s 
financial trends, i t may render us a more dist inct ive 
recognition oil i t s economic success. The creation of 
credit in th is financial sector also in teres ts us so much 
since i t plays an important role to f ac i l i t a t e and to 
accelerate the economic ac t iv i t ies , contributing to the 
smoothness of economic transactions. Irrefutably, money 
and credit i s highly correlated. When we s ta r t s to study 
the impact of credit on economic ac t iv i t i es , i t i s 
necessary for us to examine the variations of money 
supply in Taiwan as a pre-requisite for our further study 
of the linkage between credit-output and money-output. 
In the study of Taiwan's financial development, our 
analysis nuist include i t s underground economy and i t s 
unorganized financial market. As said by Mr. Chao Khau-
kong, a legislator of the ruling Kuomintang party, 
claimed that the government reckoned the underground 
economy added 25-30% to the of f ic ia l GNP figure. A 
foreign economist said i t was more like 30-40%. No 
matter whether such prediction is exaggerated or not, i t 
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has cast weight on i t s significance of affecting Taiwan's 
economic growth. 
In reviewing i t s development, one should note two 
forces at work - government control versus market forces. 
There has been a shi f t from rigid control to 
l iberal isat ion, e.g. in interest rate, foreign exchange 
rate, and the privatisation of public enterprises and 
more recently of government-owned banks. In this vein, 
Taiwan becomes more and more dependent on market forces, 
instead of on rigid control as in the past. This shif t 
from rigidi ty to f lex ib i l i ty should enhance efficiency in 
the systems, and promote a better allocation of 
resources. 
Another vi ta l change i s the reduction of restr ict ive 
regulations on foreign banks. More and more foreign 
banks have been admitted, and the offshore banking system 
has been in operation since 1984. All these are 
consequences of the policy of internationalisation and 
l iberalisation. In 1992, the real economic growth 
rate i s 6.1% which i s fal l ing as compared to the ones of 
last two years. Taiwan's exports have suffered from the 
world recession in recent years. To outline the current 
economic condition in Taiwan, we try to use some 
indicators, such as the GDP figures, private consumption 
expenditure and ixed capital formation, money supply, 
visible balance of trade, price indexes' and the 
contribution of manufacturing sector and service sector 
to GDP to f u l f i l our need. Instead of using lengthy 
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paragraphs, we s ta r t from chart 1 to chart 8 to provide 
r e a d e r s a brief recognition about the economic prof i le 
of Taiwan in the period of 1971-92. 
Chart 1 and Chart 2 show a steady growth rate of 
real GDP as well as the private consumption and fixed 
capital formation from 1971 to 1992. The real GDP growth 
rate r ises at 6.1% as compared to the las t year ' s figure. 
Over the l a s t two decades, Taiwan experienced a positive 
r e a l economic growth ra te . Besides, the accumulation of 
fixed capital also contributes to i t s industr ial 
development. The real growth rate of private consumption 
expenditure i s around 7.7% whereas the real growth rate 
of fixed capital formation i s around 9.4%. 
in chart 3, i t shows that M2 grows fas ter than M1B 
a n d Ml A. M2 exhibits an annual growth rate of 19.4% while 
t h ose of M1B and MIA are 16.4% and 9.2%. The important 
factors that contributed to the expansion of M2 was due 
to the increase in claims on government and private 
enterprises, government agencies as well as the increase 
in net assets. 
in chart 4, 5 and 7, we can see that there i s a 
favourable balance of visible trade in Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, due to devaluation of N.T. dollars and the 
inelast ic demand for imported goods, the value of 
imported goods in terms of domestic currency r ises 
rapidly. 
Besides, in chart 6, we can see a stable growth rate 
of both wholesale price index and consumer price index. 
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In chart 8, the manufacturing sector has a greater 
contribution to the GDP when compared with the 
contribution of service sector to GDP. 
All these findings render us a clear picture toward 
Taiwan's economic condition. 
In the following, we focus on the financial 
development in Taiwan. Interestingly, we find that 
Taiwan i s characterized by financial dualism. The 
informal credit market plays an important role to open a 
lending channel to small and medium-sized enterprises and 
households. There i s an close interaction between 
financial sector and real sector. 
^.2 MQPfitary Reform and nth^r Measures 
The New Taiwan Dollar Reform was put into effect on 
j u n e 15, 1949, and the value of the New Taiwan dollar 
was linked up with that of the U.S. dollar at the rate of 
NT$5 to US$1. The new currency was backed by a hundred 
percent reserve in gold, si lver, and foreign exchange, 
and the ceiling on the issuance of currency was set up at 
NT$200 million. 
In the monetary reform, under preferential interest 
rate deposits, a higher interest rate was offered to the 
depositors in order to channel their money from 
consumption to saving. Gold Savings Deposits Scheme was 
effected from May 1949 to December 1950, a noteworthy 
financial measure taken by the government to check 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































deposits, which were used to absorb currency and to dump 
gold for price stabi l izat ion, were f inal ly suspended on 
December 27, 1950. 
New financial measures were incorporated in two 
decrees: "Measures Governing Control of Gold and Foreign 
Currencies" and "Prohibition of Importation of Luxury 
Goods.
11
 The purpose was to outlaw black market dealings 
and strengthen foreign exchange and foreign trade 
control. The l a t t e r checked the outflow of gold and 
foreign currencies through rigid suppression of smuggling 
and prohibition of i l l i c i t remittances and the trading of 
imported luxury goods. 
Before the reactivation of the Central Bank of China 
in July 1961, the deposits of banks' guarantee reserves 
and payment reserves was charged by the Bank of Taiwan 
which was designated by the Central Bank. At that time, 
i t was agreed that the reserve requirement for 
"industrial banks" should be applicable to the Land Bank 
of Taiwan, the Cooperative Bank of Taiwan, and the 
Central Trust of China and that the reserve requirement 
for "commercial banks", to a l l other banks. 
Preferential interest rate savings deposits was 
introduced in March 1950. Deposits received by the 
banks had to be transferred to the Bank of Taiwan. Loans 
could be given to the depositors based on their deposit 
cer t i f ica tes , but the amount of a loan could not exceed 
70% of the amount of the deposit. At the beginning of 
1950, time deposits in a l l banks amounted to only NT$2 
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million. After the inauguration of the preferent ial 
in teres t rate deposits, the amount increased to NT$35 
million in eight months, comprising about 7 % of the 
money supply. The in teres t rate was la te r lowered from 
7% per month to 3.5% and then to 3% in 1950. In 1952, 
preferential in teres t rate savings deposits accounted for 
44% of the money supply. Because of the reduction in 
interest r;ates on shorter-term deposits, deposits of 
longer maturity increased s ignif icant ly. At the end of 
1956, deposits in one-year accounts comprised 27% of the 
to ta l deposits. At the end of 1958, the authorit ies 
suspended preferential in teres t rate savings deposits. 
Total outstanding deposits at that time amounted to 
NT$1,500 million, or 29% of the money supply. 
In conclusion, the experience of Taiwan showed an 
ant i - inf la t ion policy that was implemented through three 
dimensions: 
(1) An elimination of inflat ionary psychology by 
implementation of monetary reform; 
(2) An absorption of money supply by manipulation of 
interest rate and other measures; 
(3) The maintenance of a balanced government budget. 
In the wake of o i l crises in 1973 and 1979, while 
the big countries suffered from a negative growth rate, 
the GNP growth rate in Taiwan was 0.2% in 1974 and 5.5% 
in 1980. in 1989, i t was 7.69%. In 1993, i t was 6.1%. 
From 1958 to 1961, Taiwan government executed a 
series of financial reforms, unitary exchange system, 
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l i f t i n g of the import res t r ic t ion , accommodations to 
productive ac t iv i t i es , measures against inf la t ion as well 
as s tabi l izat ion of i t s currency, to c i te a few. The 
money supply increased by 43.4% in 1952. Within the 
period of the execution of five four-year economic 
policy, from 1953 to 1972, the annual growth rate of 
money supply was around 20%. 
The savings rate at th i s period was rather high. The 
amount of to ta l deposits grew rapidly, overwhelmingly 
surpassing the growth rate of loans. The evolution of 
financial system in i t s preliminary stage can be 
enunciated as follows: 
(1) 1949-1952 
Currency reform was launched in 1949. Through the 
Bank of Taiwan, a new currency, known as New Taiwan 
Dollar, was issued and circulated in the public. I t was 
100% backed up by gold, bullion as well as foreign 
reserves. By then, the National Currency issued by the 
mainland China was gradually disappeared in Taiwan. In 
order to encourage Taiwanese to save, a series of 
measures, such as, Preferential Savings Rate, Gold 
Deposits Rate, were effected to check inf la t ion by the 
reduction of aggregate demand. Starting from 1951, 
contractionary credit measures were pursued by the 
government. • Loans lent to government enterprises were 




In 1953, the government executed an Exchange Reform. 
In the replacement of multiple exchange rate system, a 
unitary exchange rate system was in use. The magnitude of 
exchange control was modified step by step. The 
revaluation of New Taiwan Dollar helped import capital 
goods and raw materials at a lower cost. With the 
expansion of export, foreign reserves were accumulated 
rapidly. The rehabil i tat ion of Central Bank of China in 
1961 marked the beginning of the financial development. 
The banking sector was characterized by the nationalized 
banking units. Capital market was set up in 1962. 
(3) 1963-72 
In order to keep track of economic growth, and 
allocate the excess deposits within the banking sector, 
in teres t rate on loans was lowered in the l ight of the 
decrease in deposit rate . In an attempt to lessen 
producers' interest burden and to induce people to 
invest, interest rate f e l l continuously. With effect 
from 1963, a fixed exchange rate system was set up. 
Taiwan currency was pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate 
of US$1 : NT$40. In 1966, the Bank of Taiwan was 
designated by the Central Bank of China to engage in the 
buying and selling of Public Debt. From 1961 to 1970, 
interest rates had been changed by 12 times. 
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(4) 1973-1979 
In the leverage of financial environment, the 
control on interest rate and exchange rate are the two 
effective policy instruments in the hands of the Central 
Bank. The ban on the issuance of banking licences also 
safeguards the survival of stated-owned commercial banks 
from competition, both internally or externally. The 
unsystematic, bureaucratic banking management plus a 
large proportion of unorganized financial ac t iv i t i e s in 
Taiwan were the d is t inc t features characterizing i t s 
financial development in the past decades. In 1976, the 
money market was set up. 
(5) 1980 - Present 
The range of interest rate was to be widened to 
allow f l ex ib i l i t y in operation. Moreover, interest rates 
in the money market and NCDs (Negotiable Certif icate of 
Deposits) are not subject to the maximum deposit ra te . 
The offshore banking system, which was started in 1984, 
i s growing at a fast ra te . With the New Bank Act, 1989, 
financial l iberal isa t ion has been further accelerated. 
3.3 Taiwan's Dual Financial System 
The co-existence of formal financial ins t i tu t ions 
and unorganized money market (or so-called informal money 
market or the curb market) i s the prominent feature of a 
newly industrialised countries. Taiwan i s no exception. 
The financial dualism prevails in the history of Taiwan's 
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economic development, and impinges upon i t s economic 
t ransi t ion as well as financial evolution. 
Taiwan's financial system can be c lass i f ied into two 
main categories. One i s a formal financial sector in 
which i t can be subdivided into financial ins t i tu t ions 
and financial markets. The financial ins t i tu t ions are 
composed of banks, postal-savings system, t rus t 
companies, credit cooperatives, b i l l finance companies, 
as well as insurance companies. The financial markets 
consist of capital market, money market and foreign 
exchange market. The second i s an informal financial 
sector in which there are loan sharks, underground 
investment houses, family credit , neighbourhood loan 
ci rc les , bui lder 's mortgage and so on. 
In the banking system, the Central Bank of China i s 
the bankers' bank in Taiwan. With the aids of the Bank 
of Taiwan and the Firs t Coimnercial Bank, the Central Bank 
can execute interest rate policy effect ively. In order 
to control money supply, i t can adjust the discount rate 
and required reserve ra t io to a l te r the supply of money. 
Exchange control and open market operation are also ones 
of the measures wielded by the Central Bank frequently. 
Under the supervision of Central Bank, there are so many 
commercial banks in Taiwan, acting as a financial 
intermediary for the smoothness of economic ac t iv i t i e s . 
There are also several specialized banks, such as the 
Land Bank of Taiwan, the Farmers Bank of China, the 
Export-Import Bank of China and the l ike. They 
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specialise in the financing of the industr ia l and 
commercial businesses. They can play an advisory role to 
help the enterprises to deal with the problems in the i r 
specific f ie ld . 
The existence of credit cooperative associations in 
various aspects as well as the functioning of the postal 
savings system in the absorption of savings and then 
diverting i t to the state-owned commercial banks are ones 
of the characterist ics of Taiwan financial system. In the 
l ight of eight investment and t rus t companies in Taiwan, 
they can help to accelerate the development of financial 
ac t iv i t i e s by means of buying and sel l ing secur i t ies and 
helping the companies to l i s t equities or issue corporate 
bond. 
A l i s t of financial ins t i tu t ions i s aligned in Chart 
9. In each parenthesis, there have been quoted the 
number of units and domestic off ices in each kind of 
ins t i tu t ions in 1967 and in 1993. 
As regards the increase in the number of each kind 
of financial ins t i tut ions , in 1993, the to ta l amount of 
domestic banks with the inclusion of the i r branches 
exceeded 1000. I t symbolizes the flourishing of banking 
system. Analogously, other financial units are also 
prone to open more new branches in the pursuit of a 
larger market share. With the new entrants of foreign 
banks and the emergence of offshore banking units, 
competition comes to surface inevitably. 
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Chart 9 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN TAIWAN 
A. Money Institutions 
1. The Central Bank of China 
2. The Deposit-creation Institutions 
Domestic Banks (1962: 10 with 260 branches; 1990: 16 with 718 
branches; 1993: 33 with 1046 branches ) 
Local Branches of Foreign Bank (1962: 1 ； 1990: 34 ； 1993: 37) 
、绅. 
Medium Business Bank (in 1962 it was known as Mutual Loans and 
Savings Companies: 8 with 85 branches; in 1990: 8 wrth 266 branches; 
in 1993: 8 with 359 branches.) 
Credit Co-operative Associations (1962: 81 with 150 branches; 1990: 74 
with 393 branches; 1993: 74 with 492 branches) 
Credit Departments of Farmers' Associations (1962: 291 with 293 branches; 
1990: 285 with 393 branches; 1993:285 w'rth 792 branches.) 
Credit Departments of Fishermen's Associations (1962: 0 ； 1990: 23 
with 23 branches; 1993: 27 with 34 branches.) 
B. Other Financial Institutions 
Investment and Trust Companies (1962: 1 ； 1990: 8 with 45 branches; 
1993: 7 with 61 branches.) 
The Postal Savings System (1962: postal offices 486, postal agencies 
808; 1990: postal offices 1199, postal agencies 381; 1993: post 
offices 1,245, postal agencies 342.) 
Life Insurance Companies (19&2: 5 ； 1990: 15 with 59 branches; 1993: 
27 w'rth 67 branches.) 
Property and Casualty Insurance Companies (1962: 15, when combined 
wrth Lrfe insurance Companies, there were 34 branches; 1990: 19 wrth 
73 branches; 93: 23 wrth 83 branches.) 
Bill Finance Companies (1962: 0 ； 1978:2 ； 1990: 3 w'rth 17 branches; 
93: 3 with 22 branches.) 
Fuh-Hwa Securities Finance Companies ( not existed in 1962) 
Offshore Banking units (1990: 26; 1993: 38) 
Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, The Republic of 
China• 
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3.4 Money Supply and Banking System 
The annual growth rate of money supply i s more than 
20%. Except in 1974, 1979 and 1984/ the growth rate rose 
in two-digits. In table 3.4.1, i t shows the proportion of 
net currency issued and net deposits money in money 
supply from 1949 to 1993. One point should be noted i s 
that since in 1984, the definition of money supply has 
been re-interpreted. Under different measurement, i t i s 
now classified into M1A, M1B, and M2. The old measurement 
i s the sum of net currency, net checking account and 
demand deposits. With certain modifications, M1A 
includes net currency, net checking accounts and passbook 
deposits; M1b embraces M1A and passbook savings deposits; 
and M2 i s the composition of M1B and quasi money. Table 
3.4.2 shows the growth rate of money supply in the period 
of 1979 to 1993. 
As regards the current trend of i t s growth rate, i t 
steadily decreased in las t few years. Surprisingly, in 
1989 the money supply grew at a rate of 6%. To account 
for i t , i t may be regarded as the consequence of 
transferring short-term deposits into time deposits or 
foreign currency deposits. In table 3.4.1, we can simply 
envisage the continuous decrease on the share of net 
currency on the tota l money supply. 
Due to the rest r ic t ions on the opening up of new 
banks in Taiwan, most of existing banks are publicly 
owned. With respect to the Postal Savings System, the 
absorption of deposits i s channelled to the publicly 
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owned commercial banks. As a resul t , the to ta l assets 
with these banks occupy a higher percentage of to ta l 
assets of the whole financial ins t i tu t ions . Table 
3.4.3(a) and table 3.4.3(b) depict the change and the 
share of to ta l assets in the main financial ins t i tu t ions , 
namely, Domestic Banks, Local Branches of Foreign Banks, 
Medium Business Banks, Credit Cooperative Associations, 
Credit Departments of Farmers' and Fishermen's 
Associations, Investment and Trust companies, Postal 
Savings System, Life Insurance Companies, and Property 
and Casualty Insurance. 
We can see that the domestic banks‘ share in the 
to ta l assets i s decreasing while the annual growth rate 
in Postal Savings System and Life Insurance Companies 
outweighs the others ' . In the connection with the 
public-owned commercial banks, the government enterprises 
have privileges and pr ior i ty to obtain loans from them. 
As a resul t , the private enterprises are forced to seek 
borrowing from the unorganized money market and i t sheds 
l ight on the prosperity of underground economy. In 
addition, the bureaucratic at t i tude towards management in 
banking sector retards the lending and borrowing 
ac t iv i t i e s . A complicated but t r i v i a l lending procedure 
i s unwelcomed by the private enterprises. 
Local branches of Foreign Banks are also subject to 
s t r i c t regulations. The control of foreign currencies and 
the higher loan rates comparable to the ones of domestic 
banks hinder their lending businesses. The over-
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Table 3.4.1 The Proportion of Currency in Circulation and 
Deposit Money in Money Supply, 1949-1993. 
""“Money Supply "“ Composition of Money 
YEAR Supply (in % ) 
(Annual Growth Net Net Deposits 
Rate ) Currency Money 
1949 . - 66.9 33.1 
1950 99.70 63.7 36.3 
1951 59.50 61.2 38.3 
1952 43.40 58.1 41.9 
53-56 24:46 53.2 46.8 
57-60 18.00 47.1 52.9 
61-64 22.09 41.5 58.5 
65-68 16.97 38.6 61.4 
69-72 22.46 38.8 61.2 
1973 47.00 35.8 64.2 
1974 7.02 37.9 62.1 
1975 26.20 35.8 64.2 
1976 19.46 36.9 63.1 
1977 31.10 35.8 64.2 
1978 75.39 26.2 73.8 
1979 7.37 27.3 72.7 
1980 22.71 27.8 72.2 
1981 13.78 28.4 71.6 
1982 14.60 26.7 73.3 
1983 18.44 26.0 74.0 
1984 9.25 25.1 74.9 
1985 12.22 24.3 75.7 
1986 51.42 20.3 79.7 
1987 37.82 18.2 81.8 
1988 24.37 16.4 83.6 
1989 6.00 16.2 83.8 
1990 -6.62 18.4 81.6 
1991 12.08 17.9 82.0 
1992 12.43 17.9 82.1 
1993 15.28 16.8 83.2 
N.B. Since 1978, the defini t ion of money supply i s in 
accordance with M I B . 
Before 1978, money supply was composed of net currency, 
net checking account and demand deposits. M1B includes 
net currency, checking accounts, passbook deposits,and 
passbook savings deposits. 
Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, The Republic of China. 
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Table 3.4.2 The Growth Rate of Money Supply,1979-93. 
YEAR M1a M1b M2 
197 9 7% . 8% 10% 
1980 20% 23% 22% 
1981 9% 14% 19% 
1982 6% 15% 24% 
1983 15% 18% 26% 
1984 6% 9% 20% 
1985 8% 12% 23% 
1986 46% 51% 33% 
1987 32% 38% 19% 
1988 23% 24% 18% 
1989 18% 6% 15% 
1990 一 10% -6.6% 9-9% 
1991 6.6% 12.1% 19-3% 
1992 8.3% 12.4% 19.3% 
1993 12.9% 15.3% 15.1% 
N B 
Percentage(%) increase with respect to previous year of the 
same month. , . . 
M l A = currency issued - cash in vaults + deposit money in 
checking accounts and passbook deposits. 
M1B = MiA + passbook saving deposits 
Mo = MIR + Quasi Money ， . 
Ouasi Money consists of ( l)deposits replaced by postal savmgs 
system, plus (2)time and savings deposits, plus (3) foreign 
currency deposits. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































extension in unsecured loans trapped themselves in bad 
loans to the tune of US$600 million in the early 1980s. 
After th i s painful experience, foreign banks now 
emphasize quality over quantity lending. With the 
extraordinary opportunity presented by rampant NT dollar 
appreciation, foreign banks are now operating in trade-
related and treasury side ac t iv i t i e s . In the l i f t i ng of 
exchange control, the future development of foreign banks 
in Taiwan i s promising. 
The Central Bank of China which i s responsible for 
the st ipulat ion of interest rate and rediscount ra te , and 
the Ministry of Finance which i s obligated to supervise 
the banking ac t iv i t i es and issue banking licence, are the 
highest authority in the whole banking system. 
Previously, the Central Bank set the in teres t rate with 
highest and lowest l imits . The commercial bank and the 
specialized banks should follow sui t and set the i r 
in teres t rates within th is boundary. Following the 
l iberal izat ion of interest rate, banks can s ta r t to 
s t ipulate various interest rates on the i r behalf but 
s t i l l have to abide by the Central Bank's regulations. 
Table 3.4.4 shows the conditions of deposits, loans 
and investment from 1981 to 1993. I t i s expl ic i t ly 
discovered that annual growth rate of to ta l loans and 
investment in a l l financial ins t i tu t ions surpassed the 
growth rate of deposits in 1988. As a matter of fact , i f 
we jus七 focus on domestic banks only, such changes are 
more obvious. I t ref lec ts the tightening of l iquidi ty 
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with the financial ins t i tu t ions and a steadfast r i se of 
demand for loans. 
In the l ight of financial dualism, the importance of 
unorganized investment houses should be taken into 
account. As aforesaid, private enterprises seek capital 
from unorganized money market in which they have to pay 
a higher interest rate of twice as high as the banks‘. 
Table 3.4„5 displays the loan rate between unorganized 
money market and bank, and sources of credit for private 
businesses, respectively• 
In Table 3.4.5, the ra t io of interest rate on loans 
between unorganized market and banks ranges from 1.57 at 
the lowest to 2.54 a七 the highest. Credits sought from 
unorganized money market account of 30%-40% of to ta l 
borrowing in private enterprises. (See Table 3.4.6 & 
Table 3.4.7. ) The reason for the private enterprises to 
borrow money from these unorganized money market and to 
undertake such a harsh interest burden must be the 
d i f f i cu l t i e s existing in private enterprises to acquire 
credits from the banking sectors. To ci te a few, the 
red-tape procedures, time-wasting in investigation as 
well as the requirement for collateral mortgage, are a l l 
those possible explanations. 
u other F i n a n c i a l "restitutions 
Apart from the banking sector, there are other 
financial intermediaries flourishing in Taiwan. They 
also play an important role in affecting Taiwan's 
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Table 3.4.4 The Change of Deposits, Loans
 a n d
n 
a l l Financial Ins t i tu t ions , from 1981 to 1993. 
(In Hundred Millions of N.T.$) 
1""""TStal ~Annual Total Loans ~Annual 
YEAR Deposits Growth Rate 杯 and Growth Rate „ 
(%) Investment ⑷ 
, 
1981 11,118 14.51 12,149 二 
1982 13,854 24.60 1 ^ 4 1 7 IS.61 
1983 17,593 26.99 ^ , 6 7 8 
1984 21,280 20.95 1 8 , 6 5 9 ^ • 二 
1985 2 6 , 2 5 9 2 3 - 4 0 1 9 , 8 4 9 二 
1986 32,830 25.02 20,976 S ^ 
1987 42,088 28.20 24,399 16-32 
1988 50：839 20.79 33 B05 ^ . 5 5 
1989 59,439 17.14 43,907 ^0.00 
i 9 9。 64:946 9.26 50,497 ^ . 0 1 
1991 75,991 17.01 61,590 ^1.97 
1 9 9 2 91 161 17.34 78,972 25.69 
^993 104:806 14.97 9 3 , 8 2 8 _ _ _ 1 8 . B 1 _ _ 
Source: F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s Monthly, The Republic of China. 
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Table 3.4.5 A Comparison of Loan Rate between Unorganized 
Money Market and Banks 
(Percentage per annum) 
f Year Unorganized I"“ Interes t 
Money Banks Dif ferent ia l s In teres t 
Market (2) between Multiple 
j - (1) ⑴&(2) (1)/(2) 
1961 33.51 17.70 15.81 1.89 
j 1962 30.97 17.11 13.86 1.81 
1963 28.37 15.99 12.38 1.77 
1964 24.53 14.69 9.84 1.67 
1965 23.76 14,57 9.19 1.63 
1966 23.82 14.32 9-50 1.66 
1967 23.85 13.82 10.03 1.73 
1968 23.89 13.58 10.31 1.76 
1969 25.42 13.58 11.84 1.87 
I 1970 21.25 13.57 7.68 
1971 21.49 12.47 、02 1.72 
1972 21.85 11.84 10.01 1.85 
I 1973 22.45 12.05 10.40 1.86 
1974 29.15 16.30 12.85 1.79 
1975 27.26 13.95 13.10 1^95 
！ 1 9 7 6 2 7 . 5 3 1 3 . 4 4 1 4 . 0 9 2 . 0 5 
1977 26,61 11.54 15.07 2.31 
1978 25.99 11.12 14.87 2.3A 
197 9 2% • • • - 12* 76 16.20 2 .21 
1980 30.63 14.57 16.06 2.10 
1 9 8 1 3 0 . 9 6 1 7 . 1 5 1 3 . 8 1 1』丄 
1982 28.28 13.57 14.71 ^.08 
！ 1 9 8 3 2 6 . 6 9 1 0 . 6 9 1 6 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 
！ 1 9 8 4 2 6 . 4 0 1 0 . 3 8 1 6 . 0 2 2 . 5 4 
1985 25.21 10.19 15.02 2.47 
1986 23.09 9.54 13.55 2.42 
1987 21.36 9.00 12.36 2.37 
1988 21.05 9.00 12.05 2.34 
1989 23.32 12:50 10.82 1.87 
j 1990 21.29 10.26 11.03 _2^08—— 
Source: F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s Monthlyf The Republic of China. 
»A study of the Financial System in Taiwan, Chung-hua 
Ins t i tu t ion for Economic Research, Economic Paper 
No.65. . . 
"Informal itioney market' includes ^business borrowing 
from households' and ^mutual borrowing of business 
enterprises 
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Table 3.4.6 Sources of domestic funds borrowed by business 
enterprises, 1964-1986 
‘ Share in Percentage (%) 
‘ , ' ' ~Sino-American 
Financial Money Capital Informal Development 
YEAR I n s t i t u t - Market Market Money Funds and 
ions Market Government 
Agencies 
1964 35,36 - 19.12 19.49 26.03 
1965 37.56 - 20.38 19.78 22.27 
1966 40.03 - 15.67 23.72 20.58 
1 9 6 7 4 7 . 0 9 巧 - 1 0 . 0 2 2 2 . 7 5 2 0 . 1 4 
1968 50.69 - 10.20 22.05 17-06 
1969 52.83 - 9.80 22.93 14.43 
1970 53.06 - 9.69 24.17 13.08 
1971 57.45 - 7.51 24.82 10.23 
1972 62.02 - 6.90 23.37 7.07 
1973 65.60 - 8.20 20.55 5.65 
1974 64.64 - 9.20 21.45 4.70 
1975 65.36 一 9.84 20.53 4.27 
1976 62.17 0.54 12.01 21.70 3.58 
1977 58.72 2.08 13.18 22.46 3.56 
1978 56.49 2.91 13.58 24.90 2.12 
1979 53.35 5.82 13.14 23.77 3.91 
1980 54.24 6.36 12.90 23.18 3.14 
19&1 51.67 8.72 12.56 24.26 2.78 
1982 51.59 9.53 13.35 23.04 2.48 
1983 53.15 10.35 13.11 21.03 2.36 
1984 51.15 11.57 13.75 21.16 2.36 
1985 49.61 10.93 14.13 23.08 2.26 
1986」 47.06 7.35 16,37 30.22 1.69 
N.B. Funds borrowed from financial in s t i tu t ions , informal 
money market and Sino-American Development Fund and 
government agencies are taken from Economic Research 
Department , CBC, Flow of Funds in Taiwan D i s t r i c t , 
December 1987, pp. 114-59. 
、工nfomal money market1 includes、：business borrowing 
from households' and 、mutual borrowing of business 
enterprises . Funds from the money and capi ta l markets 
are taken from Economic Research Department, CBC, 
F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c a l Monthly, Taiwan, June, 1988, pp. 
97, 99-100. In the money market, commercial papers and 
banker's acceptance outstanding are added together. 
Sources : Flow of Funds in Taiwan District, Economic Research 
Department, 198 7. Financial Statistical Monthly, 
1988. 
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I Table 3.4.7 Sources of Credits for Private Enterprises 
I In Percentage (% ) 
I Financial "“Money Share in Informal Total: 
YEAR In s t i t u t - Market (%) sector ( 1 ) + ( 2 ) + 
I ion(l) (?) (1) + (2) (3) (3) 
1964 51.9 - 51.9 48.1 100 
1965 55.8 - 55.8 44.2 100 
1966 54.3 - 54.3 45.7 100 
1967 60.6 一 60.6 39.2 100 
1968 65.0 V - 65.0 35.0 100 
1969 64.6 - 64.6 35.4 100 
1970 62.4 - 62.4 37.6 100 
1971 64.1 - 64.1 35.9 100 
1972 68.3 - 68.3 31.7 100 
1973 72.7 - 72.7 27.3 100 
1974 70.0 - 70.0 30.0 100 
1975 70.0 - 70.0 30.0 100 
1976 67.30 0.57 67.87 32.13 100 
197 7 63.31 2.89 66.20 33.80 100 
1978 59.98 4.02 64.00 36.00 100 
1979 57.15 8.13 65.28 34.72 100 
1980 54.95 8.91 63.86 36.14 100 
1981 52.80 11.71 64.51 34.72 100 
1982 53.42 13.38 66.80 33.20 100 
1983 54.88 14.31 69.19 30.81 100 
1984 54.71 15.11 69.82 30.18 100 
1985 51.69 13.26 64.95 35.05 100 
1 9 8 6 5 0 . 5 8 8 . 4 1 5 8 . 9 9 4 1 . 0 1 100 丨 
1987 56>22 6.65 62.87 37.13 100 
Source: Hsu Chia-tung, Academic Sinica from Central Bank of 
China Survey Data. 
Liu Shou-hsiang, Household saving and portfolio 




financial ac t iv i t i e s . The most pre—dominant one i s the 
Offshore Banking Units. 
Offshore Banking Units were established in July 
1984, the to ta l assets were US$43.9 million. At the end 
of 1987, i t s assets amounted to US$1,169 million. The 
source of capital was preliminarily based on domestic 
banks. By now, the capital i s obtained from the external 
financial ins t i tu t ions . From 1986 to 1987, thei r capital 
increased by about 3 times, say, from US$374.6 million to 
US$999.3 million. Due to the devaluation of U.S. dollar 
in Taiwan, most foreign exchange banks reduced their U.S. 
dollar reserves and used the Offshore Banking Units to 
borrow foreign currency. 
The scopes of business in Offshore Financial Centre 
are mainly concerned with non-financial loans, securi t ies 
investment and claims on financial ins t i tu t ions and other 
property investment. Most of their capital are invested 
domestically, contributing to the increase of securi t ies 
transaction volume and l iquidi ty of domestic banks. 
Following the establishment of money market and 
capital market, the channels of lending are not solely 
confined to the banking sectors. Money market was 
established in 1976. The financial instruments are 
composed of Treasury Bills-B, Bankers' Acceptance, 
Negotiable Certificate of Deposits, and Commercial Paper. 
I t i s noteworthy that only large enterprises are 
accessible to such lending channels while the small 
enterprises can rely on the informal money market. Also, 
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due to the change of policy, permitting the direct 
borrowing from the banks, the importance of the 
outstanding volume of commercial papers f e l l from 41% in 
1982 to 23.2% in 1989. 
In the past years (1973-1983), in the l ight of the 
great prosperity of economy, the financial transactions 
were speedily risen. In 1980, April 1, "Inter-bank Call 
Loan Centre" was set up, in which they can engage in 
short-term loan transactions in accordance with the upper 
and lower interest rate boundaries set by the Central 
Bank. Since then, the operation of the banking system 
becomes more solvent and liquid. 
Until the propagation of Security Exchange Act in 
1965 and the founding of Taiwan Security Exchange in 
1962, the capital market was unorganized and lack of 
discipl ine. Capital formation was mainly on behalf of 
banks and shops in small scale. Capital market i s 
established for the transaction of marketable securi t ies 
of more than 1 year maturity as well as government bonds. 
I t i s of importance to f ac i l i t a t e the capital formation, 
and channel savings to investment as well. 
As long as the capital market has been developed 
rather late and i t i s s t i l l small in scale, i t s 
foundation i s s t i l l far from solid. In addition, the 
regulations on capital market have not been drafted 
deliberatively. And the equities management i s too 
sophisticated for Taiwanese. Even worse, the var ie t ies 
of securi t ies were inadequate and poor in quality. 
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To reckon the number of t rus t and investment 
companies, we find that there are seven companies with 61 
branches. According to the Article 100 in Banking 
ordinance, investment and t rus t companies are one of 
special financial ins t i tu t ions in the management of 
medium, and long-term credi t . These companies play the 
role of trustee or an investor, according to a specified 
goal, and. prof i t return to manage and allocate i t s 
capi ta l . Investment and t rus t companies mainly invest in 
the production ac t iv i t ies and marketable secur i t ies . Or 
i t can aid the private enterprises to raise medium and 
long-term capital by issuing shares or bonds. 
Compared with domestic banks, from 1971 to 1986, the 
capital raised in the form of deposits inside the t rus t 
companies, r ises from 0.6% to 3.6% out of the to ta l 
deposits in a l l financial ins t i tu t ions . In 1986, the 
deposits come from individuals accounted of 60.7% of 
to ta l deposits in banks while i t accounted of 66.5% of 
the to ta l deposits in t rus t companies• 
The t rus t companies not only acted as an investor in 
the money market and capital market. More than that , i t 
also promoted the l i s t ing and underwriting of securi t ies . 
From 1973 to 1986, to ta l amount of shares sold under the 
cooperation of t rust companies was accumulated to NT$ 
々 
56.2 bi l l ion and i t gave r ise to 106 l i s t i ng companies. 
In the money market, the guarantee on Commercial Paper 
was f i r s t l y undertaken by t rus t companies. From 1976 to 
1986, of the total values of the guarantee of Commercial 
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Paper undertaken by Bil ls Finance Companies, the t rus t 
companies occupied 33.9% while the banks covered 40.4% 
The contributions of investment and t rus t companies are 
noteworthy. In addition, they also helps exploring land 
resources. 
I t s t rus t capital i s mainly raised from external 
sources or in the form of shares, public debts, and 
undistributed prof i t s . The management of t rus t companies 
i s unstable as i t i s subject to the recurrent 
fluctuations, e.g. the Cathay Investment and Trust 
Company, in 1984, t rus t capital was reduced by 63.2% 
while the t rus t capital in the Overseas Investment and 
Trust Company was reduced by 37.1%. That means, when the 
performance of one t rus t company i s poor, a l l of the rest 
t rus t companies will be affected since i t will affect the 
confidence of the people to deposit money into them. In 
facing economic recession, t rus t and investment companies 
are also the one that suffered immediately. 
Similarly, t rus t companies are not permitted to 
accept deposits of less than 6 months. Also, the deposit 
rate i s 2% higher than the ones of the banks. Along 
with the preassigned dividends to i t s c l ients , i t s 
capital accumulation i s extremely burdensome. 
In 1986, internal mutual fund was introduced. I t i s 
mainly invested in the stock market. In 1988, external 
mutual funds were being sold in Taiwan. Later, 
international mutual funds were put into practice. People 
can now buy these mutual funds from the local branches of 
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foreign securities companies while at the i n i t i a l stage, 
mutual fund was not directly sold to the people. Once a 
person was interested in buying mutual funds, he had to 
come across a security investment and t rust company as 
the agent for such transaction. All money transaction 
should be sett led offshore. For th is sake, i t 
discouraged people from purchasing mutual funds and i t 
made i t s development stagnant. 
In 1988, the restr ict ion on the set-up of t rus t 
department in banks was l i f t ed . In December, "Draft on 
the Methods of Mutual fund Management" was drawn. The 
Investment and Trust Companies and the t rus t department 
of domestic banks are authorised to issue mutual fund 
without geographical boundaries‘ restr ic t ion. 
3.6 Summarv 
Banking in Taiwan i s described as slothful, 
antiquated, swaddled in red tape, ineff ic ient , 
uncompetitive, over-protected. In recent times, the 
banking system has been moderately changed. Banks such 
as Chang Hwa Commercial Bank, the First Commercial Bank, 
and Hua Nan Commercial Bank majority owned by Taiwan's 
provincial government, are going to be privatised in the 
light of poli t ical l iberalisation. Whether a substantial 
improvement in the choice and quality of banking services 
available to Taiwan's consumers i s s t i l l hardly observed. 
However, the opening up of i t s internal banking system, 
such as, allowing local foreign banks to set up branches 
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as well as granting new licences to overseas foreign 
banks seem signalling the systematic progress in i t s 
renovation. In addition, the Ministry of Finance 
permitted the commercial banks to set up t rus t 
departments, allowing them to engage in the lucrative 
business of share underwriting and distr ibution which was 
previously monopolised by the t rus t banks and integrated 
securi t ies houses. S t i l l , th is reform i s incomplete and 
handicapped in certain aspects. To c i te an example, the 
handling of outward investment i s s t i l l not allowed in 
the commercial banks. Only two foreign brokerage 
representative offices - Jardine Fleming and Fideli ty 
International - have licences to legally promote offshore 
funds. In a l l cases the actual money transactions take 
place outside Taiwan. This impedes the development of 
mutual funds and acts as a stumbling-block on the 
invention of financial instruments - which can provide 
other investment outlets and reduce the i r risk through 
diversification• 
Apart from these inadequacies, many commercial banks 
are s t i l l predominantly owned by the government and they 
are closely related to the public enterprises ' in te res t s . 
Hence, the renovation of banking system i s at a rather 
slow pace unavoidably. 
The collapse of a large unregulated investment house 
could tr igger a financial c r i s i s on the magnitude 
of the 1985 bankruptcy of Cathay Trust and the Tenth 
Credit Cooperative in which thousands of investors lost 
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the i r savings. Since then, the propagation of new 
banking law seeks to eliminate the thriving underground 
market in lending, part of a massive, i l l ega l but 
pol i t ica l ly well connected grey market in financial 
services worth an estimated NT$40 bi l l ion a year. I t i s 
guessed that one-third of company borrowing i s done 
through th is market. In 1989, the new law provides for 
seven-year, j a i l sentences and s t i f f fines for operators 
of unlicensed deposit-taking companies. 
In spite of the steady revaluation of New Taiwan 
dollars and the decreasing of trade surplus with i t s 
trading partners under the prevalence of trade 
protectionism, a tremendous foreign reserve amounted of 
above US$70 bi l l ion i s s t i l l kept in Taiwan. In the 
foreseeable future, pressure imposed by i t s large trading 
partners on i t s economy will be unceasingly maintained. 
In the stock market, the influx of hot money in 
pursuit of short-term speculative prof i t s contributes to 
the high-flying and fluctuating stock price index, and i t 
destabil ises Taiwan's economy. Also, the overpricing in 
the real-estate market puts Taiwanese into a harsh l i f e . 
Nonetheless, the price index in Taiwan i s unexpectedly 
stable (under of f ic ia l announcement) in respect to 
continuous rise of wage rate . In fact , the Taiwanese 
/ 
entrepreneurs have removed their labour-intensive 
industries offshore and put s tress on the development of 
capital-intensive industries. 
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In brief , the problems now existing in Taiwan can be 
seen as follows: 
(1) The tightening of l iquidi ty within the banking 
sectors and financial ins t i tu t ions hinders the 
credit expansion. 
(2) The r is ing of lending rate consti tutes another 
obstacle which osci l la tes people's incentive to 
invest. 
Although Taiwan's economic development i s admiringly 
praiseworthy, i t s financial structure i s s t i l l far from 
solid. The incomplete reform of the structure of the 
banking industry, the deferral of in teres t - ra te 
l iberal isa t ion and the elimination of exchange control, 
as well as the poor development of securi t ies markets, 
a l l of these four aspects have not yet been scrutinized. 
Since the financial sectors play a supportive role on the 
smoothness of economic ac t iv i t i es , i t s existence i s 
necessary and indispensable. Whether Taiwan can make 
another miracle in i t s prospective economic development, 
no absolute answer can be made right now. 
Hard-working sp i r i t and th r i f t iness of the people in 
Taiwan are the key human factors in successfully 
exploiting the favourable geographical position of 
Taiwan. The high savings rat io and the emphasis on 
education, technical training, and research play an 
important role of her 'economic take-off‘. 
Taiwan's model of development i s characterised with 
respect to growth with equity and with price s tab i l i ty . 
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The struggle for survival resulting from their d i f f i cu l t 
po l i t i ca l and international circumstances strengthened 
the strong determination of people. This in turn 
nurtured a good supply of entrepreneurs, which have been 
a factor of growth. 
In the past four decades, Taiwan has been 
transformed from an agricultural economy to an industr ial 
one. Taiwan has been shif t ing from inward-looking 
development strategy to an outward-looking one, and from 
an import-substitution policy to an export-expansion one. 
Import t a r i f f and non-tariff barriers have been 
progressively reduced. With th is transformation, there 
has been a change from international national isolation 
in 1950—71, to international recognition, as the world 
has been amazed by Taiwan's miracle of growth. 
Doubtless to say, monetary and f i sca l policies and 
various governiaent measures play a crucial role in th i s 
transformation. Structural change in financial 
ins t i tu t ions , and gradual financial l iberal isat ion and 




EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF "MONEY-OUTPUT" LINK AND "CREDIT-
OUTPUT LINK 
Introduction 
In previous chapters, a l i te ra ture review and a 
brief introduction of Taiwanese economic development 
have been introduced. We s ta r t focusing on the impact 
of money supply and credit on economic ac t iv i t i e s . 
Specifically, we t ry to t e s t the following 
propositions: 
PROPOSITION ONE (P.1): Money supply (MS) causes 
economic growth (GNP). 
PROPOSITION TWO (P.2): Credit (CD) causes economic 
growth (GNP). 
PROPOSITION THREE (P.3): Credit (CD) and money supply 
(MS) mutually cause each 
other. 
The notion that either the money supply or the 
avai labi l i ty of credits influence domestic economic 
growth implies that the connection between money 
supply and credit are no longer highly correlated. In 
other words, presumably the role of credit seems more 
stronger than money in influencing the economic 
ac t iv i t i es . Firs t ly , we try to use a bivariate 
/ 
causality tes t to find out the causal relationship 
between money and economic growth, as well as the 
credit and economic growth. We apply the Granger's 
Causality tes t to tes t these three propositions. 
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4.1 Methodology 
A brief review of the Granger's definit ion of 
causality i s presented as follow: 
Given : X and Y are two stationary stochastic 
processes or white noises. 
Let : X and Y are the sets of present and past 
values of X and Y, respectively. 
a
2
(X|K) i s the minimim predictive error of 
X given a set of information K. 
The causality relationship can be defined as: 
1. Y causes X or there exists a unidirectional 
relationship running from Y to X if X can be 
predicted better by using both the present and 
past values of X and Y than by using the present 
and past values of X alone. This i s equivalent 
to (^(Xl X) > (^(Xl X, Y) . The idea of Y causes X 
can be defined similarly. 
2. Y causes X and X also causes Y or there exists a 







(Y|X,Y) < (^(Yl Y). 
3 • X and Y are independent if neither causes the 








Based on th is concept, many operational t e s t s 
have been formulated, notably the two sided lag 
regression of Sims, the Box-Jenkins approach of Pierce 
and Haugh, and the direct Granger approach or the 
distributed lag approach of Hsiao. Following Hsiao, 
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the causality relationship between X and Y can be 
tested operationally by using l inear predictors: 
k m 
j=i j=i (斗•丄•丄） 
P <7 
j=l (4.1.2) 
In these bivariate t e s t s , they share a common 
shortcoming in that they only allow the investigation 
of causal patterns. However, a variable may be 
influenced by more than one variable. With regards to 
th i s problem, Granger did provide a defini t ion for a 
t r iva r ia te case. 
Let Z be the third stationary stochastic process 
and Y be the set of present and past values of Z. 
Granger defined causal pattern conditional on the 
presence of Z as follows: 
1. Y causes X in the presence of Z i f X can be 
predicted better by X and Y than by X alone 
conditional on the presence of Z in both cases. 
Symbolically, Y causes X in the presence of Z if 
a
2
( X | m < o^X • The reverse causation 
of X to Y can be defined similarly. 
2. There exists a bidirectional relationship 




(X|X, Y,Y) < a
2
(X| X,"Z ) and a
2





Using linear predictors again, (4.1.1) and 
(4.1.2) can be explained to: 
k m n 
知+E . ” 
j=i j=i j=i (fi••丄.：） 
p g r 
W E w e 2 t 
j=l j=l ( 斗 • 丄 . 4 ) 
Hence, conditional on the presence of Z, Y causes X i f 
Xt can be predicted better by including Y t _ . ' s in 
equation (4.1.3) and X causes Y if Yt can be predicted 
bet ter by including Xt_,'s in equation (4.1.4). 
The specifications in (4.1.3) and (4.1.4) 
provides a convenient framework to t e s t propositions 
one to three. The three variables that concern us 
here are gross national product (GNP), money supply in 
the definit ion of Ml (MS), and avai labi l i ty of credits 
(CD) . Let GNP, MS", and CD* be the sets of present and 
past values of GNP, MS, and CD, respectively. We can 
draw the proposition 4 here: 
PROPOSITION FOUR (P.4): Money supply causes economic 
growth in the presence of 
credit . 
Proposition 4 i s consistent with the tes t of 
/ 
proposition 1 and the MS causes GNP conditional on the 
presence of CD i f CJ
2
(GNP | G N P < 
a
2
(GNP| GNP,MS") • 
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4.2 Transformation and Fil ter ing of Data 
The Taiwan's data which we have used are yearly 
data, covering the period 1953 to 1989. Refer to 
table 
4.2.1, we use three variables to run the causality 
t e s t . They include: 
(1) Nominal GNP (GNP), as defined by conventional 
national accounting standard, representing 
"income" in the model; 
(2) Money base (MS), in which we use the definit ion 
of M1 a in Taiwan's money supply. M1A emphasizes 
、the medium of exchange' function of money. I t 
i s composed of (1) the difference between 
currency issued and cash in vaults; (2) deposit 
money in checking accounts and passbook 
deposits. 
(3) Credit base (CD), which includes a l l the loans 
granted by a l l financial ins t i tu t ions which 
comprises of the whole monetary ins t i tu t ions , 
investment and t rus t companies, the postal 
savings system, and l i f e insurance companies. 
In the transformation and the f i l t e r ing of the 
data, we have used two methods, namely, one i s by 
Sim's ad hoc f i l t e r , and the other i s f i r s t 
differencing. Sims suggested differencing the raw 
data by a linear f i l t e r of the form (1-0.75B)
2
 where 
B i s the lag operator. Sims claimed that th is f i l t e r 
would work for most economic time series. In our 
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Table 4.2.1 The GNP, Money Supply and Credit in Taiwan, 1953-
1992. 
(In Hundred Millions of N.T.$) 
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1 9 7 3 4 0 7 4 1 9 8 2 3 1 0 1 9 3 9 9 2 5 5 3 6 
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1 9 8 0 1 4 4 7 9 1 2 3 0 5 4 4 4 9 5 9 4 8 6 2 5 6 6 6 3 
1 9 8 1 1 7 3 9 7 9 4 3 3 3 0 2 7 1 0 8 0 4 5 1 2 9 7 4 7 5 
1 9 8 2 1 8 5 8 9 8 3 3 5 2 6 9 3 1 2 7 0 1 3 2 3 0 9 7 8 3 
1 9 8 3 2 0 4 4 0 9 0 4 0 4 6 1 3 1 4 7 5 2 8 4 3 1 9 0 0 2 
1 9 8 4 2 3 1 1 5 5 1 4 2 7 8 6 6 1 6 4 9 3 4 9 3 1 4 8 1 1 
1 9 8 5 2 4 3 4 2 8 7 4 6 1 7 9 7 1 7 4 2 2 4 6 4 0 4 6 2 5 
1 9 8 6 2 8 1 4 3 4 9 6 7 4 8 6 3 1 9 1 7 2 9 1 5 5 9 7 3 5 
1 9 8 7 3 1 6 4 0 0 4 8 9 3 1 1 4 2 2 9 6 6 1 3 5 8 5 8 7 1 
1 9 8 8 3 4 2 3 4 0 6 1 1 0 2 1 5 2 3 1 8 9 9 7 7 -
1 9 8 9 3 7 7 5 2 5 2 1 2 9 9 3 2 3 4 1 4 2 8 4 4 -
1 9 9 0 4 3 9 0 0 9 3 1 1 7 6 4 7 3 4 6 4 2 1 1 3 -
1 9 9 1 4 8 2 8 4 3 0 1 2 5 4 2 6 1 5 6 8 9 7 2 5 -
199 2 5301961。 1 3 5 8 9 2 4 7 2 7 2 7 8 7 -
F
 Credits from monetary ins t i tu t ions 
工 Credits from informal money markets 
Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, The Republic of China. 
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f i r s t attempt, we find that the adjusted data brought 
out from th is ad hoc f i l t e r cannot pass the Dickey-
Fuller t e s t s . Whereas in using the f i r s t differencing 
method, af ter taking logarithm on the original ser ies , 
and then are f i rs t -differenced, i . e . passed through 
the (1 - L) f i l t e r , the outcome i s in compliance with 
the Dickey-Fuller t e s t . The s ta t ionar i ty of the time 
series can thus be obtained. 
4.3 Causality Test Procedure 
The causality t es t will be done with the 
bivariate case f i r s t and then with the t r iva r i a t e 
case. Before proceeding, le t us redefine the 
variables: 
Y = Differenced log Gross National Product (GNP) 
M = Differenced log Money supply (MS) 
C = Differenced log financial credits (CD) 
(1) The bivariate case: 
With the bivariate framework, the three 
propositions can be tested by the following equations: 
k m 
GNPt p^NP^Y,  +elt …” 
j=l j=l ( 4 • 3 •丄） 
p g 
GNPt=e-Y： ^j^t-j^t … ， 、 
j=l j=l ( 4 . J . Z ； 
/ s u 
j=l j=l ( 4 • J • ) 
7 9 
b d 
j = l ( 4. J . 4) 
P. 1 and P. 2 are true if GNPt can be predicted 
bet ter by including the MSt - 's and CDt_. ‘s in (4.3.1) 
and (4.3.2), respectively. Equation (4.3.3) and 
(4.3.4) are used to tes t whether feedback occurs 
between MS and CD. 
For the determination of the lag k, m, p, q, s, 
u, b, and d, we adopt the Akaike minimum Final 
Prediction Error (FPE) cr i ter ion. The FPE of a 
predictor i s simply the mean square prediction error. 
If GNPt i s the predicted value of GNPt in (4.3.1), FPE 
=E(GNPt 一 GNPt)2. Alternatively, FPE can be defined 
operationally in terms of the sum of squared error 
(SSE) of the regression equation: 
• 一 N+k+m+l-SSE 
N-k-m-1 N 
Where N i s the number of observations. The equation 
with the optimal number of lags i s the one with the 
minimum FPE. However, the number of regressions 
needed will be enormous. If k = 0 , . . . , 20 , and m = 
1 , . . . , 20 , the number of regressions equals 420 ！ A 
more eff ic ient approach suggested by Hsiao i s followed 
/ 
which involves two steps: 
(i) Regress GNPt on a constant term and i t s own past 
values for k=0,. . . ,20, and choose the number of 
lags k which gives the min FPE (GNP) which i s 
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given by 
. N-^k + 1 SSE 
min FPE(GNP)= 丄 
N-k-1 N 
( i i ) For a given k"A (4.3.1) i s running again with the 
MSt_j ' s included and with m = 1 , . . . , 20 . Again, 
the equation with lags (k,m) i s chosen which 
gives the minimum FPE(GNP,MS): 
„„„, ,,。、 N+k+m-^1 SSE 
mm FPE (GNP,MS )=~~=^-='—77-
N-k-m-1 N 
After performing steps (i) and ( i i ) , a single 
equation i s chosen for (4.3.1) which gives the optimum 
number of lags and in. Kawai then defied two forms 
of causality: 
(1) weak form: MS weakly causes GNP if min 
FPE(GNP,MS) < min FPE(GNP). 
( i i ) Strong form: MS strongly causes GNP if a l l the 
coefficients for MSX_. ‘ s are jointly and 
significantly different from zero, i . e . , T , S 关 
0. 
Obviously, i f one variable strongly causes the 
other, i t must also weakly cause the other but the 
reverse may not be true. 
A similar procedure can be applied to equations 
(4.3.2), (4.3.3), and (4.3.4) in order to tes t P.2 and 
P.3. 
(2) The Trivariate Case: 
For the t r ivar ia te case, the equation (4.3.1) i s 
modified as: 
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k m n 
GNPt=a^ ^ t - ^ E 
j=l j=l j=l ( U . b ) 
Using (4.3.5) as an example for i l l u s t r a t ion , the 
three steps procedure suggested by Kawai for finding 
the optimum lags (k", m, 11) i s br ief ly summarized as: 
(i) Regress GNPt separately on GNPt-j's and CDt_j's for 
k = 0 , . . . , 20 and 11 = 0 , . . . , 20 and then choose 
the six best equations in each case according to 
the minimum FPE cri ter ion. 
( i i ) Regress GNPt on both GNP^'s and CD^'s for the 
36 combinations of best lags for GNPt_3- and CDt_j 
obtained in step (i) . Hence, there are 36 
regression equations to be run. The best lags 
(k rn) i s chosen for the equation with minimum 
FPE(GNP,CD) which i s given by: 
N-^k+n + 1 SSE 
min FPE(GNPfCD) = ^ _ ！1 
N-k-n-1 N 
( i i i ) Given the optimum lags k, and n, the Mt_】's are 
now included with . . . , 20 . Again, the best 
lag m i s chosen for the regression with the 
minimum FPE(GNP,MS, CD) which i s given by: 
/ 
N+Jt+in+n+ 1 SSE 
min FPE (GNP,MS,CD) =。_ _ _ -
N-k-m -21-1 N 
This three-steps procedure i s used to tes t P.1, 
i . e . , to tes t if MS causes GNP conditional on the 
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presence of the third variable CD. Both forms of 
causality can then be defined as: 
(i) MS weakly causes GNP conditional on the presence 
of CD if mill FPE(GNP,MS,CD) < min FPE (GNP, CD). 
( i i ) MS strongly causes GNP conditional on the 
presence of CD if a l l the coefficients of Mt_,s 
are joint ly and signif icantly different from 
zero, i . e . , r j ' s 乒 0. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
(1) The bivariate case: 
Proposition 1 - Money supply (MS) causes economic 
growth (GNP): Table 4.4.1(a) indicates that the 
inclusion of M1A improve the predictive accuracy of 
GNP. For a l l combinations of incomes and money supply, 
min FPE(GNP) > min FPE(GNP,MS) and the F- s t a t i s t i c s 
for a l l r . r s are significantly from zero. Thus both 
the weak and strong forms of causality are fu l f i l l ed 
and we can conclude that , for the bivariate case, 
money supply causes economic growth. Table 4.4.1(b) 
shows that there i s no feedback between MS and GNP. 
Proposition 2 - The supply of credits (CD) 
accommodate economic growth (GNP): The empirical 
evidence reported table 4.4.2(a) indicates that for 
a l l the combinations of incomes and credit supply, the 
inclusion of the credit supply variables does improve 
the predictive accuracy of GNP i . e . , min FPE(GNP,CD) 
< m in FPE(GNP). The F-s ta t i s t i c s are significant 
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indicating that a l l the S.'s are joint ly and 
different from zero at least at the 10% level. 
Therefore, credit supply both weakly and strongly 
cause the movement in economic growth. Added to th i s , 
in table 4.4.2(b), CD and GNP mutually cause each 
other. 
Proposition 3 - Credit (CD) and money supply (MS) 
mutually affect each other: Table 4.4.3(a) & 4.4.3(b) 
shows that for a l l combinations of money supply and 
credi t , min FPE(MS,CD) < min FPE(MS), and min 
FPE(CD,MS) < mill FPE(CD) . The p . f s and v . ' s are a l l 
joint ly and signif icantly different from zero at least 
at the 5% level, and the 1% level, respectively. 
Therefore, we can conclude that proposition 3 i s 
true and money supply (MS) and credit (CD) weakly and 
strongly accommodate each other. 
2. The Trivariate case: 
Proposition 4 - in the presence of credit , the 
resul ts in Table 4.4.4 do not support the notion that 
money supply causes economic growth. The weak form 
causality i s fu l f i l l ed whereas in most cases min 
FPE(GNP, MS) > min FPE(GNP, MS, CD)• The F-s ta t i s t i c s 
shows that the causality i s not significant enough to 
f u l f i l the strong form of causality cr i ter ion. 
4.5 Summary 
I t has been found that money supply (MS) and 
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credit (CD) lead to economic growth in Taiwan. (Note: 
They are only significant at 10% level . ) The 
empirical evidence indicates the col l inear i ty between 
money and credit . Undeniably, they cause each other. 
As regards the linkage between GNP and MS, 110 feedback 
occurs. The avai labi l i ty of credit can be much more 
accurately predicted af ter the inclusion of GNP. 
In the t r ivar ia te t e s t , with the presence of 
credit , i t further weakens the causal effect of money 
supply on economic growth. In other words, the 
col l ineari ty of credit and money will reduce the 
predictive power of them as they are regarded as two 
individual variables in the regression. 
Without taking the unorganized money market into 
th i s analysis, in connection with the empirical 
evidence, the coherence of credits and money supply i s 
undoubtedly one of the key factors contributing to the 
previous resul ts . In Taiwan, without considering the 
informal channel of credit creation, hardly can we 
draw a conclusion on the importance of credit and 
money in affecting the economic growth. 
In chapter 5, we try to look into th i s issue by 
taking the unorganized money market into account. 
4 
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Table 4.4.1(a) The Effect of Money Supply on Gross 
National Product Without Credit Supply 
k m 
GNPt:cxS PjGNP^^ 







GNP MS 1 1 2.4931 2.6877
b
 F(3,31)=2.2644* 
Table 4.4.1(b) The Effect of Gross National Product on 
Money Supply Without Credit Supply 
1 n 
MSt=f5^  njGNPt-j+e2t 











iThe F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the MSt.^' s are jointly equal to zero. 
2
The F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the GNPt-j,s are jointly equal to 
zero . 
b
 min FPE (GNP,MS) < min FPE (GNP). 
c
 min FPE (MS,GNP) > min FPE (MS). 
#
 indicates that the F-statistics are insignificant. 
* indicates that the F-statistics are significant at the 
10%. 
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Table 4.4.2(a) The Effect of Credit Supply on Gross 
Domestic Product Without Money Supply 
p q 







GNP CD 1 0 2.4760 2.6877
b
 F(3,32)=2.5447* 
Table 4.4.2(b) The Effect of Gross National Product on 
Credit Supply Without Money Supply 
r h 
j=i j=i 











The F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the CDt.j' s are jointly equal to zero. 
4
The F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the GNPt.j's are jointly equal to 
zero. ‘  
b
 min FPE(GNP,CD) < min FPE(GNP)• 
min FPE(CD,GNP) < min FPE(CD)• 
* and *** indicate that the F-statistics are significant at 
the 10% and 3% level, respectively. 
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MS CD 1 10 6.3347 12.6306
b
 F(12,13)=3.7442** 
Table 4.4.3(b) The Effect of Money Supply on Credit 
Jb d 
CDt=e^ c ^ C D t — 广 e 6 t 
j=i j=i 











The F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the CDt.j' s are jointly equal to zero. 
6
Tlie F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the MSt_"s are jointly equal to 
zero . 
b
 min FPE (MS, CD)' < min FPE (MS) • 
min FPE (CD,MS) < mill FPE (CD). 
** and **** indicate that the F-statistics are 
significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.4.4 The Effect of Money Supply on Gross 
National Product Conditional on the 
Presence of Credit 
k m n 
j=i j=i j=i 
Optimum Lags min FPE min FPE(GNP,MS)/ 
(GNP,MS,CD) min FPE (GNP, CD) 







GNP MS CD 1 1 0 2.4581 2.4759 F(4,30) = 1.7733
$ 
7
The F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the MSt.j
1
 s are jointly equal to zero. 




SIGNIFICANCE OF UNORGANIZED MONEY MARKET 
5.1 The Unorganized Money Market in Taiwan 
Intermediation problems caused by industr ial size 
structure and imperfect information have been 
aggravated in Taiwan by s t r i c t financial regulation, 
by selective credit controls, and by repressed 
interest rates. Taiwan's formal financial system has 
been rigidly controlled over the las t three decades. 
Banks are government owned and bureaucratically 
regulated, and the authorit ies have largely inhibited 
competition from foreign banks. Nonbank financial 
ins t i tu t ions have also been highly constrained. One 
resul t of th is government regulation has been that 
banks (the dominant credit ins t i tu t ions) operate 
through very bureaucratic and conservative procedures. 
In simple fact, banks in Taiwan have functioned 
as l i t t l e more than a chain of pawnshops: Three-
quarters or more of what they lend must be secured by 
col la teral , generally in fixed assets. Administration 
of banks have been mired in red tape and often 
inefficiency. Because bank o f f i c i a l s have been held 
personally responsible for every penny of "the state" 
money by government auditors, they have taken few 
/ 
r isks; their main object being to avoid errors and to 
advance through the bureaucracy. In such an 
atmosphere, the propensity for credit rationing and 
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inef f ic ien t intermediation substantially increases. 
Two of the most important elements of financial 
regulation are controlled interest rates and selective 
credit controls. Bank interest rates in Taiwan have 
been subject to direct government control, and 
government has consistently exercised th i s control as 
an important factor in monetary policy. In the las t 
three decades, o f f i c i a l interest rates were controlled 
at levels well below the natural rate that would have 
cleared the market. The large 10 to 20 percentage 
point gap in these periods between o f f i c i a l loan rates 
and informal money market rates i s evidence of th i s 
disequilibrium. 
Undoubtedly, controlled interest rates have 
aggravated credit rationing and allocative 
ineff ic iencies in o f f i c ia l loan markets and have been 
responsible for a diversion of savings into the 
unregulated financial sector. 
Since the 1950s, concessional selective credit 
programs have also been part of the government's 
financial policy. Exporters‘ "strategic industr ies ," 
and other types of enterprises have, through special 
discount windows at the Central Bank, received bank 
loans at less than general loan rates . With the 
addition of special interest rates and outright 
channelling of bank credit to favoured borrowers, a 
three-t iered credit market emerged. At the top were 
enterprises such as exporters, which could get 
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subsidized interes t rates, in the middle were other 
priveged borrowers 一 mostly larger firms 一 which paid 
the bank general loan rates, and at the bottom were 
the majority of small and medium companies, which lead 
to seek rela t ively high-cost finance in the informal 
credit market. 
Many authors writing about Taiwan's industr ial 
growth mention the limited access of small firms to 
formal financial intermediaries. Together with 
Taiwan's imperfect credit and capital markets, there 
i s a high share of self-financing, part icularly for 
the great number of small and medium-sized firms in 
manufacturing and trade. Banks offered discriminatory 
loan contracts to those having access to the financial 
system. Short-term loans for working capital were 
extended to the firm only af ter a record of business 
success was established and af ter the firm had grown 
to a respectable level of sales. Some small companies 
did obtain access to start-up loans through personal 
credit to the company owner. These were generally 
collaterized loans based on home mortgages. Until the 
mid-1970s, even mortgage-based personal loans were 
limited. Only as bank l iquidity grew rapidly with 
increasing trade surpluses in the late 1970s did 
mortgage lending increase substantially. 
I t i s important to note that , although bank 
lending may have had interindustry and intra-industry 
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allocative biases, Taiwan's financial system 
consistently favoured private over public sector 
borrowers. Although the state has s t r i c t l y controlled 
financial intermediaries and interest rates , i t did 
not exercise th is control, as did the governments of 
so many other developing countries, to expropriate 
increasing amounts of seigniorage. Conservative 
f i sca l policy in Taiwan meant that the real cost of 
financial res t r ic t ion - "squeezing out" private sector 
credit demands - never materialized. Given the high 
positive correlation between the share of domestic 
credit flowing to the private sector and the level and 
efficiency of aggregate investment, favouring the 
private sector doubtlessly had considerable positive 
influence on Taiwan's rate of economic growth. 
I t i s clear from the evidence of outstanding 
loans that small enterprises have been subject to 
quantity rationing and s t a t i s t i c a l discrimination in 
formal credit markets in Taiwan. Faced with a 
d i f f i cu l t credit intermediation problem, i t prompted 
to the unrestricted development of an active informal 
credit market as an eff ic ient adjunct to regulated 
credit inst i tut ions. In adopting th i s compliant 
stances, the government permitted the existence of a 
series of "markets" for credit side by side, differ ing 
in types of borrowers and the terms of loans. These 
markets effectively sorted borrowers along dimensions 
of both "information intensity
11
 and r isk . 
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Borrowers with significant financial resources 
and reputations (for example, public enterprises and 
large manufacturing and commercial firms) had access 
to "full-information" credit markets (such as 
commercial banks, o f f i c i a l money markets, and equities 
markets), while r iskier borrowers with limited 
resources (mostly new entrants and many small and 
medium enterprises) were served by "information-
intensive" credit markets (informal lenders and money 
markets and leasing and instalment companies). The 
line of demarcation between different segments of the 
credit market in Taiwan was quite pronounced because 
of heavy government regulation. 
5.2 Empirical Results with the inclusion of 
Unorganized Money Market 
The supply of credit through the unorganized 
money market shares about 20% to 35% of the to ta l 
credit created by the financial ins t i tu t ions . Due to 
the incompleteness of the data set , the yearly data 
will range from 1964 to 1987. The data i s f i r s t 
differenced and then subject to the Dickey-Fuller 
t e s t . In th is view, the series has been proved to be 
stationary. 
We use the direct Granger Causality t es t and 
follow the above propositions, P.1 to P.3. With the 
inclusion of the credits from the informal money 
market, the results are far different from the ones 
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aforementioned. 
For Gross National Product (GNP) and money supply 
(MS), the yearly data ranged from 1964-1987. On the 
credit supply, in the l ight of figures according to 
the financial ins t i tu t ions , we try to approximate the 
credits channelled from the unorganized money market 
in which transactions are legally forbidden. 
In taking table 4.4.1(a) and table 5.2.1 into 
comparison, with the exclusion of data from 1953-1963, 
the predictive power of money supply on economic 
growth in table 5.2.1 has been strengthened. I t i s 
probably due to the tremendous ins t i tu t ional and 
governmental policy changes during i t s preliminary 
development in 1950s. From 1964 onwards, the changes 
on money supply can greatly accommodate the economic 
growth when compared with the case in table 4.4.1(a). 
The causal relationship between credit (CD) and 
income (GNP) can be explici t ly seen from table 5.2.2 
With the inclusion of black market‘s credit , the 
causal effect of credit supply on economic growth 
seems to be extremely strong or practical ly existent. 
There i s strong and consistent evidence showing that 
economic growth i s led by the credit supply. I t i s 
not surprising that th i s accommodation phenomenon can 
/ 
happen because many private enterprises in Taiwan 
finance their private investment by resorting to th is 
informal channels - the unorganized money market. 
Admittedly, there i s a huge di f ferent ia l of 
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in teres t rates between these two credit markets: 
formal and informal ones. The Taiwanese borrow money 
from the unorganized money market regardless of the 
twice as much as the interest burden they undertake 
whereas if the loans are borrowed from the o f f i c i a l 
credit market, thei r interest burden will be 
tremendously lowered. 
To. our surprise, the linkage between money supply 
and credit has collapsed. In table 5.2.3, we find 
that credit i s no longer closely related to money 
supply. Likewise, with the inclusion of credit from 
the informal money market, the dis t inct ive role of 
credit on economic growth i s so signif icant , which i s 
no longer closely related to the money supply in 
Taiwan. In our findings, the inclusion of credit of 
the informal money market has strengthened the 
predictive accuracy of credit on output. Therefore, 
the informal finance in the developing countries i s 
s ignif icant . In the following, we look into Taiwan's 
informal money market and account for i t s 
significance in fac i l i t a t ing economic growth in 
Taiwan. 
Financial Instruments in the Informal Money 
Market 
In the informal money market, the most important 
financial instrument fac i l i t a t ing de f a c t o 
intermediation was the post-dated check. Postdated 
checks were normally used to accommodate flows of 
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Table 5.2.1 The Effect of Money Supply on Gross 
Domestic Product Without Credit Supply 
k m 













 F-s ta t i s t ics
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Table 5.2.2. The Effect of Credit Supply on Gross 
Domestic Product Without Money Supply 
p 
GNPt=e^ 6jC Dt-j+ e3t 
j=l J=1 













Table 5.2.3 The Effect of Credit on Money Supply 
s u 
MSt=X^ 广Z PjCDt-,-+e5t 
j=i 












The F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the MSt-j,s are jointly equal to zero. 
9
The F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the CDt. j' s are jointly equal to 
zero. 
"The F-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients of the CDt.^ ' s are jointly equal to 
zero. 
e 迎己 f indicate that the F-statistics are significant at the 
1.72% and 1.27% respectively. 
h
 shows that the F-statistics is insignificant. 
b
 min FPE(MS,CD) < min FPE(MS). 
min FPE(GNP,MS) < min FPE(GNP). 
min FPE(GNP,CD) < min FPE(GNP). 
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trade credit and other financial transactions between 
firms. Transactions were conducted with 30- to 45-day 
postdated checks made out for an amount equal to the 
principal plus interest for the agreed time period. 
These checks could then be discounted by the supplier 
through brokers. Because trade credit was so 
important for doing business in Taiwan, the government 
intervened to secure the postdated check market. 
Businessmen in Taipei say that postdated checks are 
widely used because "they are the only legal financial 
instrument•" 
In fact , the development of the postdated check 
system depended on Taiwan's Negotiable Instruments 
Law. The law specifically made a l l endorsers equally 
responsible for redeeming checks with the issuer. 
Government agencies policed the system, keeping 
records on bad check cases and referring malefactors 
to the courts for prosecution. Commercial banks were 
also involved in regulating the system by t ightly 
controlling the number of blank checks allowed per 
customer and by reporting violators to government 
authorities• 
Although the postdated check continues to play a 
prominent role in Taiwan's financial transactions, 
several factors are causing a decline in the use of 
th is instrument. Firs t , since the late 1970s the 
regulated money market has grown steadily, together 
with the average size and sophistication of business 
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firms. Banker's acceptances and commercial paper are 
beginning to replace informal financial instruments. 
Second, af ter a recent financial scandal involving the 
informal money market, government moved to reduce the 
significance of the postdated check system. In 1987, 
the criminal penalty for issuing bad checks was 
abolished. Expecting a major credit slump as a result 
of th is action, the government expanded short-term 
credit accommodation at banks by promoting the use of 
commercial paper and discounted time le t t e r s of 
credit; increased Commercial banks‘ purchasing of 
accounts receivable; and eased conditions for opening 
commercial bank checking accounts. 
Another factor in business finance i s "Byau 
hwei u. I t i s so nearly universal an aspect of 
personal and business finance in Taiwan that i t i s 
important to mention. The hwei has a long standing 
history in Chinese society. 
Basically, a hwei, or group, i s organized when 
one person decides he or she needs some money and 
others, his or her personal acquaintances, have money 
to invest. The originator, or hwei tou ( l i t e ra l ly 
..group head") takes responsibility for the hwei. Each 
time the highest bidder can collect the by an, and from 
then on pays back in at the interest rate at which he 
or she won the bid. Thus, the person who least needs 
money, and can afford not to bid or collect throughout 
the lifetime of the hwei, will end up making the most 
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money. 
Besides, lease and instalment companies are the 
money resort to small and medium enterprises. Through 
thei r a f f i l i a t ion with large manufacturing companies 
and nonbank financial ins t i tu t ions , they provide a 
financial channel to small and medium enterprises 
without access to regulated financial ins t i tu t ions . 
Lastly, loans and investments from friends and 
relat ives have been crucially important in Taiwan, 
particularly for start-up capital . More than 90% of 
Taiwanese businessmen received start-up capital from 
their friends and re la t ive . In addition, new 
infusions of loans and investments from friends and 
relat ives were important as small companies faced 
cyclical business problems or as they needed finance 
for expansion. 
Since under Taiwan's bankruptcy law there i s no 
such thing as subordinated credit , friends, re lat ives , 
and investors who would normally be simple company 
shareholders have preferred lending to firms rather 
than paying in capital . Because of the "insider" 
status of friends and relat ives, the i r loans for a l l 
practical purposes were privileged. In the event of 
financial distress, they were often paid back f i r s t , 
as if their debt were subordinated. Many investors 
also preferred to lend firms money rather than to buy 
equity because interest income i s treated more 
favourably than dividends by Taiwan's Internal Revenue 
1 0 1 
Service: Interest i s tax deductible and i s not double 
taxed by corporate income tax. 
5.4 Significance of the Unorganized Financial Market 
According to Scitovsky (1986), in accompany with 
the formal credit market, the unorganized money market 
can play a complementary role in providing 
information-intensive, eff icient credit facilities• 
I t was so called the ”small loans" function of the 
unregulated money market. Also, the emergence of a 
large and thriving unorganized money market has 
significantly helped to mobilize domestic saving by 
offering high return on investable funds. The 
unregulated money market increased the "fungibility" 
of financial resources by offering an alternative 
market-determined interest rate on investment funds. 
W e call i t the "safety valve" function of the market. 
Above a l l , the most essential function of the 
unorganized money market i s to f ac i l i t a t e business 
dealings between heterogeneous firm, contributing to 
the high economic growth rate in Taiwan. 
The informal money market can sat isfy the need of 
small, r iskier borrowers. Compared to formal 
financial insti tutions, the former can extend the 
credit f ac i l i t i e s to the small businessmen more 
cheaply and eff iciently. Thus, i t made a net 
contribution to allocative efficiency. A long-
standing personal contact among relatives and 
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friends, and between small businessmen and equally 
small lenders or credit brokers who live nearby can 
costlessly guarantee their creditworthiness, when 
comparing with the costs incurred on investigation by 
loans off icers at large commercial banks. Typically, 
in Taiwan, because of heavy government interference, 
bank lending officers tended to be overly 
conservative• 
The efficiency of the unorganized money market as 
a lender to small and medium-sized enterprises i s 
characterized by four features:-
1. Lenders in the unorganized financial market can 
maintain a closer relationship with their 
cl ients and therefore know the la t t e r better 
than do commercial banks lenders. 
2 . Lenders enjoy a lower operating costs since they 
work from less elaborate establishments, pay 
lower wages, and require less paperwork. 
3. Resources are saved from non-price competition 
because interest rates are determined by the 
market• 
4 . Government influence on the unorganized 
financial market i s less since the la t t e r i s not 
subject to the regulations of commercial bank, 
/ 
such as reserve requirements. 
In most less developed countries (LDC), the 
emergence of underground economy is symbolized by 
fragmented markets, the bi lateral nature of 
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transactions, high interest rates, and the short-term 
nature of most loans. Such features are evidence to 
be claimed on by people to account for financial 
inefficiency in these economies. However, i t seems 
that a l l these characteristics in fact ensure their 
efficiency as financial intermediaries to small and 
medium enterprises. 
In addition to i t s contribution to allocative 
efficiency, the unorganized money market owes i t s 
significance to ease firm entry and exi t . Analysis of 
industry- and firm-level data shows that the 
industries with the fastest productivity growth rates 
also had the highest rates of entry-exit turnover. In 
Taiwan, th is informal lending channel enabled 
entrepreneurs to s ta r t businesses with almost no 
assets. After serving a short apprenticeship in a 
larger (often foreign) company to learn about 
production ski l l s , technology, and potential 
customers, Taiwanese entrepreneurs could s tar t their 
own businesses once they obtained an export order from 
a foreign or local trading firm. With an order in 
hand, an array of informal credit poss ib i l i t ies opened 
up. 
With a Letter of Credit from a foreign buyer, 
working capital could be raised through friends and 
relatives, unorganized financial market moneylenders, 
and postdated or third-party checks. Rental of 
capital equipment also reduced start-up risk 
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substantially, as i t made easy to exit business if 
sales did not materialize. Finance to do a l l th is was 
provided quickly and flexibly with low collateral 
requirements• 
As savers cannot receive a higher return from 
their deposits in formal financial markets, they are 
willing to put their money in the unorganized money 
markets which offer them a higher return. This 
occurred in two ways. Firs t , by virtue of their lower 
transaction costs, and by avoiding the implicit 
taxation imposed by commercial banks (through controls 
on lending and deposit rates and reserve 
requirements), the unorganized money markets mediated 
savings that otherwise would not have saved at a l l . 
Second, the market induced very small savers to save 
amounts that otherwise would have been spent on 
t r i v i a l consumption, as evidenced by the byau hweif 
which are important vehicles for personal savings and 
investment in Taiwan. 
A s a safety valve, the informal money market 
helps contribute to allocate efficiency by 
accommodating those borrowers rationed out by lower 
r e t u r n projects because of government imposed 
restr ict ions on loan contract and credit rationing. 
If the credit of formal financial inst i tut ions i s 
in i t i a l ly channelled to certain uses, in conjunction 
with disequilibrium interest rates or selective 
government controls, and those uses are less 
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profitable than other opportunities, the unorganized 
financial market will assist with the reallocation of 
credit from less to more profitable uses at market-
equilibrium rates of interest . In Taiwan, where 
interest rate repression and financial subsidies were 
moderate, the "safety valve" played a smaller role. 
In fact , small and medium businessmen has benefited 
more from small loan function of the curb market. 
The presence of an active unorganized money 
market in Taiwan added materially to the fungibility 
of financial resource. The prevailing opportunity 
c o s t of investable funds was ultimately guided by the 
higher market interest rate which is market determined 
in the unorganized money market. Firms with access to 
commercial bank loans at controlled interest rates 
inevitably had to weigh returns on planned investments 
against returns from on-lending the funds at higher 
unorganized money market rate. Accordingly, the 
higher opportunity cost (determined by the unorganized 
money market) of investable fund often deterred 
entrepreneurs from undertaking lower yielding 
investments, even when they had access to cheap bank 
f u n d s . This factor kept the average efficiency of 
aggregate investment high in Taiwan. In turn, higher 
aggregate' investment efficiency resulted in higher 
rates of economic growth. 
By the same token, the "safety valve" function of 
the informal money market played a key role in making 
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effective the subsidies implicit in low interest rates 
and concessional selective credit policies. If the 
banks issuing low-interest loans did not extract a l l 
the rents from the original borrowers through 
collateral requirements, compensating balances, and 
side payments, firms with access to loans at 
preferential interest rates had the opportunity to on-
lend these funds in the unorganized money market. 
Without this market, the effective subsidy would have 
depended on the investment return in the firm's 
business act ivi t ies or on the short-term savings 
deposit rate. In an outward-oriented country like 
Taiwan, exporter reaped most of the subsidies made 
effective by an active unorganized money market, 
because government loan programs were generally aimed 
at tradable goods. 
Taiwan‘ businessmen took up many forms of 
subcontracting in both supplier and producer 
ac t iv i t ies . Most export producers became linked to 
t ight networks of small independent "job-shopper," 
each producing small parts of a product that would be 
f inal ly assembled by the central factory and exported 
through foreign or local trading companies. Such an 
industry structure re l ies heavily on markets rather 
than hierarchical-based economy. 
Taiwanese preference for family-owned, 
independent firms rules out extensive vert ical 
integration, as does the flexible-niche strategic 
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orientation of Taiwanese firms, which requires 
r e l a t i v e l y small, fast-moving production 
establishments. By linking the financial and 
production act ivi t ies , the unorganized financial 
ac t iv i t ies were tremendously important to support 
innumerable and varied market transactions between 
heterogeneous enterprises. 
Accordingly, in Taiwan, where larger, well-
established enterprises have access to bank credit and 
small firms do not, transactions between producers and 
suppliers and between large factories and 
subcontractors are almost always accompanied by 
finance. Motivation for these loans, apart from 
maintaining good relations within the industry, i s to 
ensure subcontractor loyalty and dependability in 
terms of specifications of the production contract, 
product quality, timing of delivery, and so forth. 
Production contracts also faci l i ta ted financial 
contracts. In connection with the unorganized money 
market, large firms committed themselves to provide 
financial support to small subcontractors in the form 
of extensive trade credits, direct loans for equipment 
and working capital, acceptance of postdated checks, 
recommendations and credit guarantees for small 
subcontractors at banks in exchange for small 
contractors' loyalty and dependability. If a small 
firm's reputation was notorious, the firm might 
probably go bust easily. In tradit ion, Taiwanese 
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businessmen played a great effort to build up the i r 
hsin-yung ("reputation", " re l iabi l i ty" , or "credit-
rating" ) and the word also refers to the quality and 
r e l i ab i l i t y of a firm's products. If someone loses 
his hsin-yung, no one will advance him any more money 
(postdated checks, and so on) or goods, and his 
creditors s t a r t demanding immediate repayment. 
Last but not the least , unorganized financial 
ins t i tu t ions , such as, leasing companies, which allow 
firms to set up with rental factories and equipment, 
reduce vulnerability at tr ibutable to sunk investment. 
Likewise, extensive trade credit , postdated checks, 
lease companies, and loans and deposits from friends 
and relat ives a l l substantially ease firm entry and 
exi t , making assets more easily redeployable. By and 
l a r g e , these unorganized financial ac t iv i t ies reduced 
transaction costs and fac i l i ta ted contracting by 
substantially lowering transaction-specific (sunk) 
investment and asset specif ici ty. 
c; R Summary 
I n summary, the four characterist ics 
aforementioned contribute to the formation of 
important role of unorganized money market in Taiwan. 
A s long as the heterogeneous industrial structure 
s t i l l prevails in Taiwan, the survival of small and 
medium-sized firms should heavily rely on i t s 
continuity. Nowadays, with the flourishing of money 
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markets and other financial inst i tut ions, loans 
demanded from the unorganized money market drop 
drast ical ly. Nevertheless, i t i s of no doubt that i t 
s t i l l plays an important role in fac i l i ta t ing economic 
ac t iv i t ies . Such financial dualism i s attributable to 
t h e consistent uptrend of Taiwan's economic growth. 
Besides, in our empirical findings, the credit-
output link i s more significant in the case of Taiwan. 
！ t cannot be denied that nonbank credits are so 
essential to small enterprises as they can benefit 
from this informal lending channel which encourages 
them to take up r iskier investment and provides 
stimulus for economic development. 
4 
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rnMCLUSION 
Basing on the l i terature review in chapter 2, the 
d i s t i n c t i v e roles of .oney and credit in ^ - n e t a r y 
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t rough which monetary policy actxons affect 
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demand by affecting the avaxlabxlxty 
^ that bank loans are specxal for a 
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 i t
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• o. s ib le (prohibitively costly) to obtaxn 
costly) or impossible {pj-u 
^ in other words, bank loans 
credit from other sources. m 
a r e not perfect substitutes to exther 
and other credit are noT： y 
l e n d e r s sanies and other nonbanX fxnancal 
b o r r W e r s or lenders. c r e d i t mar.et 
. .广 s t because ot sucn 
intermediaries exist d 
„ i m p e r f e c t i o , , N e v e r t h e l e s s , —
1
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l … h i-pchnology and the 
their dependency on banKs. Changes xn techno gy 
, o f f i n a n c i a l xnarlcets have reduced infer,atxon 
structure of tmancj.ax 
口see Bernanke(1993, pp.55-57). 
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and monitoring costs associated with making loans to many 
businesses, increasing firms' direct access to financial 
markets and nonbank sources of funds. In this respect, 
the specialness of bank credit has been reduced 
significantly. 
Some empirical studies of the U.S.
18
 show that the 
effects of monetary policy through the change in these 
two financial aggregates - money and bank credit - may 
have predictive relationship with the output in different 
period of time. Nevertheless, consensus has not yet been 
reached on which one can have a stronger predictive 
power. 
In studying the relationship between the financial 
intermediation and economic development, we try to look 
at the significance of unorganized money market which 
renders a lending channel to small and medium enterprises 
to finance their investment. In our empirical finding, 
with the inclusion of credits from the unorganized money 
market, the predictive accuracy of credit on output i s 
strengthened. In this respect, we highly appreciate the 
complementary role of informal money markets working hand 
in hand with the formal financial inst i tut ions in the 
developing countries. Taiwan is one of the typical 
examples• 
After the l i terature review, a brief introduction 
of Taiwan financial development i s given in chapter 3. 
Taiwan's economic achievement i s partly attributable to 
18
See Lown and Hayes (1990). 
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the hard-working sp i r i t and thr i f t iness of the people in 
Taiwan. Besides the high savings rat io, the government 
policies emphasized 011 education, technical training, and 
research also played an important role contributing to 
her 'economic take-off‘. 
In reviewing i t s development, one should note two 
forces at work - government control versus market forces. 
There has been a shif t from rigid control to 
l iberalisat ion, e.g. in the interest rate, foreign 
exchange rate, and the privatisation of public 
enterprises and more recently of government-owned banks. 
Nowadays, Taiwan i s relying heavily on market forces, 
instead of on rigid control as in the past. 
The informal money market denotes the unsatisfied 
demand for funds and the regulation of the banking and 
financial system. I t provides a lending channel to small 
enterprises at a higher interest rate. In the wake of 
the establishment of money market and capital market and 
the introduction of new financial instruments, such as, 
Commercial Papers and Bankers' Acceptance, people can 
seek financial support from these channels. As a result , 
the informal money market is gradually losing i t s 
importance. Recently, deposits have grown much faster 
than loans signifying that the banking system is in a 
rather l iquid'state, because of the big inflow of foreign 
funds, consequent upon the export surpluses. This may 
also be considered as a reflection of low investment 
incentive, as the demand for loans for the sake of 
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investment is not up to expectation. Evidence shows that 
Taiwan has been experiencing a financial reform. Through 
i t s liberalization of financial structure, should Taiwan 
total ly neglect the contribution of the informal sector 
in i t s economic development? 
After depicting the economic profile of Taiwan, we 
undertake Granger Causality tests with respect to the 
case of Taiwan. In the bivariate tes ts , we find that 
both money and credit have explanatory power in the link 
with economic growth (GNP). Money supply causes economic 
growth. However, i t i s surprisingly found that economic 
growth does not cause the change of money supply. 
Regarding the relationship between credit and Gross 
National Product, they do mutually cause each other. 
Generally speaking, the availability of credit affects 
economic activit ies since the former is used in financing 
investment. In return, the continuous economic growth 
represents the prosperity of financial market in which 
funds are available. In money-output link, the 
continuous economic growth does not lead to a rise in the 
transaction demand for money. With the existence of 
money substitutes and under the fixed exchange rate 
regime in Taiwan, the economic growth rate may not lead 
to the change of money supply. 
In the trivariate tes t , in the presence of credit, 
the notion that money supply causes economic growth can 
only be held in weak form. It may be due to the 
collinearity of credit and money that may reduce the 
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predictive power of them as they are regarded as two 
individual variables in the regression, 
As we have mentioned in chapter 2, the informal 
money markets are essential in the economic growth of 
developing countries. After we have taken the formal 
money market into consideration in chapter 4, we turn to 
see the impact of informal money market on Taiwan economy 
in chapter 5. To begin with, we add up the loans from 
both channels - formal monetary institutions and informal 
money markets - and do the causality tes ts . With the 
inclusion of credit from the informal money market, the 
predictive accuracy of credit on economic growth i s 
strengthened. This helps us justify the significance of 
the informal money market in Taiwan economy. Informal 
money market has added substantially to the fungibility 
of financial resource in Taiwan. 
To investigate the significance of the informal 
money market, we are surprised at i t s influence in 
various aspects. I t can provide "small loans" function 
to small, riskier borrowers and mobilize domestic savings 
by offering lenders and savers a higher return than they 
would have received in formal financial markets. I t can 
also act as a "safety valve" to accommodate those 
borrowers rationed out because of government-imposed 
restrictions on loans contracts and credit rationing. 
Besides, i t functions as a linkage of credit and 
production transactions in which financial support can be 
obtained only if production contract i s laid down. 
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As a conclusion, money and credit are two aggregate 
variables that may more or less affect economic 
ac t iv i t i e s . In the study of informal money market in 
Taiwan, we find that i t can sat isfy the need of a 
part icular group of Taiwanese, especially for those small 
investors. I t can help to minimize the transaction costs 
between lenders and borrowers. Besides, informal 
arrangements provide a basis for establishing links with 
formal ins t i tu t ions so as to provide a fu l le r range of 
services. Despite a l l these essential features of 
informal money markets, the role of informal money 
markets has gradually declined during the process of 
l iberal izat ion of banking system and financial 
innovations in Taiwan. In our suggestion, i f the 
government can envisage the significance of th i s informal 
lending channel, i t should t ry to incorporate i t into the 
formal financial system. As we have clearly seen in 
chapter 2, formal and informal finance each has i t s areas 
of comparative advantage.
19
 Our major recommendation i s 
that policy should proceed on a recognition of th i s 
complementarity and fac i l i t a t e informal finance in i t s 
own areas of comparative advantage. This will increase 
the flow and reduce, the cost of credit to borrowers 
neglected by the formal sector. As a conclusion, in the 
process of financial l iberalization and deregulation in 
Taiwan, informal money market should be incorporated as 
part of formal financial inst i tut ions. Above a l l , to 
19
For detai ls , see Prabhu Ghate (1992, P.16) 
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have the informal money market formalized, the government 
may have a much more effective control over the whole 
financial system. 
/ 
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